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WATERS v. CHURCHILL:'
GOVERNMENT-EMPLOYER EFFICIENCY, JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE, AND THE ABANDONMENT OF
PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH BY THE
SUPREME COURT
INTRODUCTION

The speech and assembly clauses of the First Amendment 2 allow for the expression of individual opinion, the exploration of conflicting ideology and belief, and the preservation of
a representative democracy.3 While the Supreme Court ac114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend L The First Amendment
is applicable to state actors through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (UFor present purposes we may and do asume
that freedom of speech... protected by the First Amendment from abridgement
by Congress ris] among the fundamental personal rights and liberties' protected by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States.).
3 Justice Holmes articulated the importance of free speech values in shaping
the conceptual framework of the Constitution in his compelling dissent in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919):
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Id. at 630. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J,
concurring):
Those who won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion
is a political duty, and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
1

2
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knowledges that freedom of speech occupies a "preferred position" in constitutional jurisprudence,4 the Court has determined that this freedom is subject to limitation by the government.' In particular, considerable limitations are now firmly
established in the government workplace, where public-employee speech receives little first amendment protection.
The Supreme Court first directly confronted the issue of
government restrictions on public-employee speech in 1968.6
In Pickering v. Board of Education,' the Court established an
analytical framework that balanced the employee's interest in
speaking on matters of public concern against the government
employer's interest in suppressing that speech in order to
maintain workplace efficiency.' In its first application of this
balancing test, the Court rigorously reviewed the government's

American government.
See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ('The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system."); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F.
535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.) ("[The] right to criticize either by temperate
reasoning, or by immoderate and indecent invective, [is] normally the privilege of
the individual in countries dependent upon the free expression of opinion as the
ultimate source of authority."), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
For a review of the philosophical underpinnings of freedom of speech, see
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO THE PARLIA3ENT OF ENGLAND (1644), and JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, CH.

II (1859).
' In United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Justice Stone
expressed the notion that some constitutional liberties such as freedom of speech
deserve more vigilant judicial protection against the political process: "There may
be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth [Amendment.] Id. at 152-53 n.4.
Five years later, the Court unequivocally stated that "freedom of speech . . . [is]
in a preferred position." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Harlan, J.):
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech ... as protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, [is] "absolute," not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must
prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be
gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment.
See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 21-39.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).

' See id. at 568 and infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
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justifications for limiting employee speech in the workplace. In
later decisions, however, the Court relinquished its oversight
role and increasingly deferred to government justifications for
restrictions on employee speech.9

During the 1994 Term, the Court revisited the issue of
public-employee speech rights. In Waters v. Churchill," the
Court considered whether the established balancing test
should apply to the employee's speech as determined by the
government employer or as determined by a neutral factfinder.
A divided Court held that the balancing analysis should be
based on what a government employer reasonably believes an
employee said." Although the Court required the government
employer to engage in an investigation before disciplining the
employee for his or her speech, it did not explain when such an
investigation is constitutionally mandated, what type of investigation is appropriate under particular circumstances, or how

' See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), Givhan v. Western Line Consol
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979), and Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), discussed infra text accompanying notes 40-85.
Numerous commentators, as well as members of the Court, have severely
criticized this retreat from meaningful judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Richard H. Hers,
FirstAmendment Speech Rights of Government Employees: Trends and Problems in
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit Decisions, 45 Sw. L. . 741, 824 (1991) ('But
when important interests are present on both sides of the scales, the court should
be especially meticulous in assessing their weight as well as any actual negative
effects of the employee's speech upon bona fide . . . governmental interests."); Toni
Ml. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector
Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 77 (1987) ("Subduing [the] voices [of public employees] may hamper the flow of information about government operations, impair
employee well-being, and reduce overall government effectiveness. Silence of this

order is a central first amendment concern. It deserves the Court's full first
amendment attention."); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) ('Vigilance
is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees
simply because superiors disagree with the content of
to silence discourse ...
employees' speech."); Connick, 461 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Such extreme deference to the employer's judgment is not appropriate when public employees voice critical views concerning the operations of the agency for which they

work.").
10 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
n Id- at 1878 (plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor upholding broad powers of
government employers to limit public employees' first amendment rights yet requiring employer to conduct a reasonable investigation before discharging an employee for speech); id. at 1891 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment to clarify that a
government employer must actually believe its investigation results); id. at 1893
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment yet severely criticizing the investigation requirement).
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a government employer should balance its own efficiency interests against an employee's free speech interests. 2 Waters thus
provides little guidance to government employers and employees in determining either the scope of the substantive free
speech right within the workplace or the procedural requirements necessary to safeguard that right. More importantly,
Waters indicates that the Court has abandoned a genuine judicial review of government employers' decisions based on employee speech merely because the government was acting in its
capacity as employer rather than as sovereign. The Court's
withdrawal weakens the preferred position of freedom of
speech in the constitutional scheme and jeopardizes the first
amendment rights of eighteen million federal, state and local
public employees."
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should
adopt a balancing test that provides more protection for publicemployee speech. Part I of this Comment examines the development of the Court's public-employee speech doctrine, focusing on several important precedents that create the conceptual
and analytical context for Waters. Part II reviews the facts and
procedural history of Waters, and describes the sharp theoretical and practical differences among the various opinions. Part
III argues that the Supreme Court, under the guise of creating
first amendment procedural safeguards for employee speech,
has actually provided government employers with a potent
means for further stifling employee speech within the
workplace. The fundamental flaw in the analysis of the Waters
plurality is the acceptance, and further entrenchment, of a
false dichotomy between the government's interest in acting
efficiently as employer and as sovereign. Part IV recommends
an alternative analysis that, instead, would balance the potentially greater impact of employee speech on workplace reform
and public awareness against a government efficiency interest
that remains the same regardless of whether the government
is acting in its capacity as employer or sovereign. This approach would provide the appropriate level of protection for
free speech rights while preserving judicial deference to gov-

'"

See discussion infra text accompanying notes 147-216.

See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table
No. 500, at 318 (113 ed. 1993) (figure from 1991).
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eminent interests in efficiency.
I. THE HISTORY OF EMPLOYEE SPEECH

A. The Right-PrivilegeDistinctionand AssociationalLiberty
Historically, the Supreme Court has viewed government
employment not as a "right" justifying constitutional protection, but merely as a "privilege" that the government could

deny for any reason.'4 The right-privilege distinction afforded
the government wide latitude in abridging the first amend-

ment rights of its employees. Until the late 1950s, judicial review focused on public employees' "freedom of association," a

liberty not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment but
nevertheless derived from the specific rights of speech, press,

assembly and petition."5 In conjunction with the Cold War
effort to root out Communists and other "subversives" from
government, the Court upheld a variety of government rules

that conditioned public employment on the taking of loyalty
oaths by employees or the disclosure of employees' past membership in certain organizations. 6
The Warren Court reversed this trend in a series of deci-

1, This view stemmed from Justice Holmes's decision in McAuliffe v. Mayor of

New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892), where he observed that 't]ha petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman."
See generaly JoHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. RoTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL L4W
1062-69 (4th ed. 1991):

The Court has deduced the right to associate for expressive activity from
the express guarantees found in the First Amendment. [Currently] ...

[tihe government cannot limit this right to associate unless the limitation
serves a compelling government interest unrelated to the suppression of
ideas and this governmental interest cannot be furtfhered through means
that are significantly less restrictive of the associational or expressive
freedom.
" See, e.g., Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (sustaining the dis-harge of a
municipal employee who refused to answer questions relating to allegedly subversive associations for fear of self-incrimination); Adler v. Board of Educ, 342 U.S.
485 (1952) (sustaining a New York State law that required teachers to take a
loyalty oath); Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upholding a municipal ordinance that required each city employee to swear that he
or she had neither personally advocated the overthrow of the government nor
belonged to an organization which advocated such overthrow within the past five
years).
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sions that systematically struck down state and federal legislation premised on the right-privilege distinction and aimed at
public employees' freedom of association.17 By 1967, the Court
had thoroughly repudiated the notion that a public employee
had to sacrifice associational rights to obtain or keep a govern5 the Court held
ment job. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,"
that the New York State Board of Regents could not dismiss a
tenured university professor who refused to sign an affidavit
swearing that he had never been a member of the Communist
Party. 9 Recognizing that the "danger of [the] chilling effect
upon the exercise of vital first amendment rights must be
guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is being proscribed,"" the Court restricted the
government's ability to punish those employees who would not
sacrifice constitutional liberties for employment opportunities.
B. The Court Attempts a Balancing Approach: Freedom of
Speech v. Government Efficiency
When hysteria over subversion in government subsided
during the early 1960s, the Court redirected its inquiry into
government regulation of public-employee speech. In the seminal case of Pickering v. Board of Education,"'the Court began

'1 In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court struck down a state

law that required nonresident corporations to reveal the names and addresses of
all members residing in the state, holding that "[s]tate action which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." Id.
at 461. The Court also used this approach in decisions concerning restrictions on

freedom of association in the government workplace. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down an Arkansas law requiring teachers to sign

affidavits containing the names of all organizations to which they belonged or
contributed in the past five years).
385 U.S. 589 (1967).

The New York State Legislature had codified this requirement in what became known as the "Feinberg law." This law charged the Board of Regents with
the responsibility of creating a list of "subversive" organizations. If the Board
found that a teacher was a member of one of these groups, he or she could be
summarily dismissed. Any current faculty member who failed to sign the affidavit
could also be dismissed. The Court had upheld the constitutionality of the
Feinberg law in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), but claimed in

Keyishian that "constitutional doctrine which has emerged since that decision has
rejected [Adler's] major premise." Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605.
' Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604.
21 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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to explore and define the scope of an employee's right to express opinions about or in connection with the government
workplace. Pickeringinvolved an Illinois Supreme Court deci-

sion upholding a school board's dismissal of a teacher for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the board's han-

ding of various financial matters. The Supreme Court reversed, asserting that the government may not constitutionally

compel public employees to relinquish their rights as ordinary
citizens to speak on matters of public concern, especially in
connection with the operation of the government workplace

where they are employed.' The Court noted, however, that
the State has interests in regulating public-employee speech

"that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection

with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.', 4

The Court concluded that it must balance "the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public

concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees. ' s

Although the Pickering Court did not establish a general
constitutional standard to control every situation in which a

' The school board had proposed two bond issues and two tax increases in an
effort to raise revenues for the building of new schools and to provide additional
funds for existing educational and athletic programs. The school board justified
Mr. Pickering's dismissal by claiming that numerous statements in his letter were
false, and that the publication of the letter "would be disruptive of faculty discipline, and would tend to foment controversy, conflict and dissension among teachers, administrators, the Board of Education, and the residents of the districts Id.
at 566-67. The Court rejected both of these contentions. See infra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text.
I I& at 568 (citing Wieman v. Updegrafg 344 US. 183 (1952), Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US. 589
(1967)).
24 1& The Court cited no authority for this proposition. The Court's acceptance

of this proposition necessarily meant that an individual's interests in free speech
would receive less constitutional protection depending on whether he or she spoke
as a citizen or as an employee.
21 Id. The Court tied Pickering's free speech interests to his status as a citizen
and not as an employee. This distinction freed the Court from the re3ponsibility of
delineating the scope of a public employee's free speech rights, and from determining whether Pickering may have had a greater interest in his speech as an employee rather than as a citizen. The Court maintained that it only had to decide

whether Pickering's speech addressed a matter of public concern and was protected
against libel according to the "actual malice" standard enunciated in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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government employer sanctioned an employee because of
speech, 6 it did provide a loose set of criteria to guide lower
courts in balancing employer and employee interests. The
Court listed several inquiries important for a proper consideration of the government's interests. First, did the employee's
speech result in a breakdown of discipline between superiors
and employees or lead to disharmony between coworkers?'
Second, did the employee's speech affect any personal loyalty
or confidence necessary to sustain a specific employment relationship?' Third, did the employee's speech interfere with the
operation of the government agency generally? Finally, was
the employee's speech evidence of incompetence sufficient to
constitute an independent basis for dismissal? ° The Court
also enumerated factors important in considering the
employee's interests, including whether the employee spoke on
matters of legitimate public concern, 3 whether the particular
employee was a member of a class that could provide knowledgeable and informed opinions regarding the issue, 2 and the
particular forum in which the employee uttered his or her
speech.'
Applying these factors, the Court concluded that the First
Amendment protected Pickering's speech.' The Court held
that "absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly
made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on is-

The majority claimed that:
[blecause of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical
statements by. .. public employees may be thought by their superiors,
against whom the statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay
down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569. The Court failed here to maintain its distinction between the free speech rights of an individual as a citizen and as a public employee.
" Id. at 570.
2a Id.
29

Id.

30 Id.

at 572-73.
at 573 n.5.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573-74. The Court did not attempt to define what it
meant by "public concern," either through its own analysis or through reliance on
precedent. Instead, it simply reached the conclusion that Pickering's speech was in
fact "a matter of legitimate public concern." Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
3 Id. at 571-73.
"

" Id. at 574.

1995]

PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH

1063

sues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment."' The Court also determined that proper school administration was a matter of legitimate public concern that required "free and open debate.'
Furthermore, Pickering's position as a teacher assured his
ability to comment knowledgeably on this issue.4 Finally, the
Court flatly rejected the school board's contentions that
Pickering's speech had damaged the reputations of its members and would disrupt the efficient operation of the schools
and the board itself." The Court thus held that Pickering's
interest in his speech as a citizen outweighed the school
board's interest in restricting that speech. 9
Pickeringclearly established that citizens do not surrender
their constitutional rights as a condition of public employment.
Nevertheless, the Pickering Court recognized that the government, acting as employer rather than as sovereign, can restrict
those rights in order to protect its interests in efficiently discharging its assigned responsibilities. Pickering required lower
courts to conduct a stringent review of the employee's speech
I& at 574.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.
The Court stated that "it is essential that [teachers] be able to speak out
freely on such questions [as the operation of schools] without fear of retaliatory
dismissaL" Id. at 572.
1 Id, at 569-71. The majority concluded that: (1) according to the record, no
one in-the community responded to Pickering's statements except the school board;
(2) the statements were not directed at any persons with whom the appellant had

a close working relationship which could thereby be undermined; and (3) "[n]o evidence was introduced at any point in the proceedings regarding the effect of the

publication of the letter on the community as a whole or on the administration of
the school system in particular, and no specific findings along there lines were

made." Id. at 567. The Court would not incorporate this final consideration into its
balancing approach in future cases. Instead, it abandoned the requirement that a
government employer introduce specific evidence that an employee's speech actually

disrupted the government workplace, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151 (1983),
and substituted a judicial exploration into the potential adverse consequences of
the speech within the workplace. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1890
(1994).

"The Court addressed a similar issue in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 US. 593
(1972). In Perry, the Court ruled that an untenured college professor was entitled
to a due process hearing to determine if he was in fact fired for exercising his
first amendment right of free speech. The professor had criticized a Texas school
board decision that opposed the elevation of the college from a two-year to a fouryear program. Subsequently, the school board did not renew his employment con-

tract. The Court held that the teacher's criticism of the board's decision was a
matter of public concern and therefore constitutionally protected. Id. at 593.
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and its impact on the employer's workplace in order to ensure
a proper balancing of interests in each case. The balancing
analysis enunciated in Pickering, however, did not address
several important issues. In particular, the Court did not clarify the type of causal link that a public employee must demonstrate between his or her speech and the government sanction
in order for employment to be constitutionally protected.
C. The Court Tips the Scales in Its BalancingApproach
After Pickering, it was unclear whether a government
employer could discharge an employee based on a combination
of constitutionally protected and unprotected speech. The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Mount Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle.4" Doyle, an untenured
public school teacher, called a local radio station and described
the contents of a memorandum that he had received regarding
the school board's plan to promulgate a new dress code for
teachers.4 He also engaged in a number of confrontational
incidents with both students and staff at the school.42 The
board subsequently decided not to renew Doyle's employment
contract, claiming that these incidents and the call to the radio
station sufficiently demonstrated Doyle's lack of professional
tact as well as his insincerity in fostering healthy school relationships.4 3 The district court held that the First Amendment
protected Doyle's telephone call to the radio station." The
court decided that because this protected communication had
played a substantial role in the board's decision not to rehire
Doyle, the board had to rehire him with back pay.4 5 The Sixth
- 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
41 Id. at 282.
' Doyle referred to a particular group of students as "sons of
had made obscene gestures to two female students whom he claimed
instructions. Id. He also criticized cafeteria staff about the quality of
Id. The district court found that the First Amendment would allow
fire Doyle based solely on this conduct. Id.
43

bitches," and
disobeyed his
their service.
the board to

Id.

"Id.
at 284. The district court accepted Doyle's reasoning that instituting the
dress code illustrated the board's view "that there was a relationship between

teacher appearance and public support for bond issues." Id. at 282.
" Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284. In reviewing the two reasons given by the
board for terminating Doyle's employment, the court stated that "[i]f a non-pormissible reason, e.g., exercise of First Amendment rights, played a substantial part in
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Circuit affirmed. 46
After applying the balancing test required by Pickering, a
unanimous Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts' conclusion that the First Amendment protected Doyle's telephone
call to the radio station.47 Under Pickering, this finding
should have ended the Court's analysis. Nevertheless, the
Court rejected the notion that Doyle was entitled to remedial
action simply because his protected speech might have played
a substantial role in his termination.48 The Court feared that
predicating government-employer liability on speech that did
not concern the challenged action would encourage a public
employee in danger of being discharged for unrelated reasons
to engage in constitutionally protected speech. In so doing, the
employee could "prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire [him
solely] on the basis of that record." 9 To avoid this "undesirable consequence," Justice Rehnquist concluded that a public
employee had the dual burden of proving that: (1) his or her
conduct was constitutionally protected;-' and (2) this conduct
was a "substantial factor" or a "motivating factor" contributing
to the government's employment decision."' If a public employee satisfied this two-pronged test, the government employer could then prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that it
the decision not to renew (the contract]--even in the face of other permissible
grounds--the decision may not stand." Id.
4' Doyle v. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.
1975).
0Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284. Nevertheless, the Court noted that "[trhe
District Court did not expressly state what test it was applying in determining
that the incident in question involved conduct protected by the First Amendment,
but simply held that the communication to the radio station was such conduct.!
Id. at 283. The Court did not expressly state any tests of its own.
3 Id. at 285.
Id. at 285-86. Justice Rehnquist asserted that:
[a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire could
place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done
nothing.
Id- at 285.
"Id, at 287. The Court gave no indication of how the employee ahould attempt to prove this constitutionally protected status to the satisfaction of a court.
61 I& at 287. Justice Rehnquist did not explain whether the "substantial factor"
standard and the "motivating factor' standard required the same level of proof,
although the latter would appear to be a less stringent test.
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would have reached the same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct."52 The
Court assumed that this "but-for" causation analysis" adequately, protected a public employee's constitutional rights
while furnishing the government employer with the necessary
flexibility in making its employment decisions."
The Mount Healthy approach reveals the Supreme Court's
growing reluctance to interfere with employer decisions and its
increasing deference to government justifications for sanctioning public-employee speech. The Court added a new dimension
to its balancing analysis by saddling a public employee with
the initial evidentiary burden of proving that his or her speech
was constitutionally protected and a substantial factor for the
government employer's sanction.55 More importantly, the
Mount Healthy approach allows a government employer to
escape constitutional liability by demonstrating that it would
have reached the same employment decision in the absence of
such protected speech. 5 This approach makes little sense if
the public employee has already proven that the government's
actions were substantially based on constitutionally protected
speech.57 Thus, Mount Healthy removes a potential evidentiary problem for government employers who sanction an employee based on both constitutionally permissible and impermissible reasons.
Although the Mount Healthy causation analysis creates
new evidentiary burdens concerning a government employer's
motives for the discharge, it leaves untouched the question of
when the offending speech addressed a matter of public con-

Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.

The Court used this terminology to describe the second prong of the Mount
Healthy analysis in its decision in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439
'

U.S. 410, 417 (1979), discussed infra text accompanying notes 58-65.
"Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
' Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 270-

71 n.21 (1977) (plaintiff claiming equal protection violation in city rezoning plan
must prove that "invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" in the

rezoning decision)).
"Id.
"

As with the equal protection analysis in Arlington Heights, the Mount

Healthy Court does not explain why an employee is not immediately entitled to
remedial action after proving that her constitutionally protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in her discharge, instead of merely shifting the
burden of justification to the government employer.
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cern and thus deserved constitutional protection. In Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District,' the Court held
that the First Amendment protects an employee who speaks
privately with an employer on a matter of public concern as
well as one who engages in public discourse.' Givhan had
been a public school teacher in Mississippi for eight years
when the school district decided not to renew her employment
contract.' During the year prior to the school districtes decision, Givhan had submitted a series of lists to her principal
which included Givhan's ideas on more fully integrating the
school. 6' The principal claimed these lists were "petty and
unreasonable demands" that hindered his work.' The Fifth
Circuit concluded that unless a government employee actually
spoke about a matter of public concern in public, the First
Amendment did not protect the speech or require the balancing
analysis defined by Pickeringand Mount Healthy.'
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the court of
appeals's reasoning. The Court held that first amendment protection is not 'lost to the public employee who arranges to
communicate privately with his employer rather than to
spread his views before the public.' The Court determined,
however, that judicial review of private speech in this context
necessarily must involve the weighing of additional factors:
when a public employee personally speaks to an immediate
supervisor regarding an issue of public concern, the government employer's efficiency may be threatened not only by the
content of the employee's message, but also by the "manner,

439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 411.

Ayers v. Western Line ConsoL Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir.
1977). The district court characterized the lists as follows:

These [lists] all reflect Givhan's concern as to the impressions on black
students of the respective roles of whites and blacks in the school environment. She "requestedV among other things: (1) that black people be
placed in the cafeteria to take up tickets, jobs Givhan considered 'choice,'
(2) that the administrative staff be better integrated, and (3) that black

Neighborhood Youth Corps workers . . . be assigned cemi.clerical office
tusks instead of only janitorial.type work.
Id. (citation omitted).
' Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414.
3 Id.
"Id. at 415-16.
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time, and place in which it is delivered." Thus, although the
First Amendment may guarantee a public employee the freedom to communicate privately with his or her employer on
matters of public concern, the Court will protect this freedom
only if the balancing analysis reveals that the manner, time
and place of the employee's speech did not impinge on government efficiency interests. Like the evidentiary burden imposed
by the Mount Healthy Court, the manner, time and place factors added by the Givhan Court created yet another hurdle for
public employees who seek to vindicate their constitutional
right to freedom of speech.
The Court incorporated the Givhan factors into its analysis when it upheld a discharge punishing publicly made and
nonconfrontational employee speech in Connick v. Myers.66 In
Connick, the Court held that the First Amendment did not
protect an assistant district attorney's distribution of a survey
to colleagues that communicated her personal concern about
office policy and procedure. Moreover, in concluding that the
survey addressed matters of public concern "in only a most
limited sense," the Court further narrowed the realm in which
a public employee would receive constitutional protection for
criticizing a government employer.67
' Id. at 415 n.4 (citations omitted). The Court did not indicate how these
additional factors modified the balancing test, but stated simply that "striking the
Pickering balance in each context may involve different considerations." Id.
The Supreme Court has held that the government may regulate the "manner,
time and place" of speech uttered in a public forum, provided the content of the
speech is not restricted. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)
(manner, time and place restrictions are valid if they are "content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication.") (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Such a restriction on speech is justified:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
The Grace and O'Brien decisions undeniably contemplate that the Court will
use the manner, time and place factors to determine whether the government has
overstepped its constitutional ability to restrict speech, and not, as Givhan implies,
to determine whether the particular speaker has overstepped the bounds of constitutional protection.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
,See id. at 154.
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Sheila Myers had served with distinction as an assistant
district attorney in New Orleans for over five years.' In the
fall of 1980, District Attorney Connick informed Myers that he
was transferring her to another department." Myers opposed
the transfer and promptly notified her superiors:' She also
discussed with them her opinions on various office policies and
procedures. After Myers received an indifferent response from
her superiors, she prepared and distributed a confidential
survey to her colleagues which addressed a range of office
topics' When Connick learned about Myers's actions, he
promptly fired her.:2
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice White, the Supreme
Court reasoned that "Pickering,its antecedents and progeny,
lead us to conclude that if Myers's questionnaire cannot be
fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons
for her discharge." 3 The Court thus implied that first amendment protection for employee speech would attach only if the
employee could prove, as a threshold issue, that he or she
spoke on a matter of public concern."4 Otherwise, Justice
White noted, the Court would extend "wide latitude" to government employers in managing their employees, and would limit
the judicial balancing of interests.: In order for a reviewing
c Id. at 140.

cId.
" Id, at 14041. Alyers believed that a transfer would result in a conflict of
interest because her new position would place her in contact with certain persons
on probation whom she currently counseled. Id. at 141 n.1.
I Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. The survey polled the impressions of the other
assistant district attorneys "concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." Id.
I' Connick gave Mlyers three distinct reasons for the firing- (1) she had refused
to accept the transfer, (2) her distribution of the survey was "an act of insubordination"; and (3) particular questions contained in the survey were especially objectionable--namely, those inquiring about employee confidence in superiors'
decisionmaking abilities and pressure on employees to work on political campaigns.
Id,
' Id. at 146 (citing Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973) and Schmidt v. County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 932, 984

(10th Cir. 1977)).
7' Justice White did not provide a workable definition of "public concern,"
claiming only that the employee's speech must be "considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community ... ." Id.
76 Id,
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court to determine whether the employee spoke on a matter of

public concern, it must examine the "content, form, and context" of the statements "as revealed by the whole record."'
The Court gave no indication as to how these factors should be
applied or the weight to be accorded to each.
Connick's new approach shifted the critical judicial analysis from a careful balancing of employee and employer interests to an inquiry into the employee's reasons for speaking.
When Justice White examined Myers's survey, he found that it
reflected "one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer and an
attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause c6lebre."7 The
majority did conclude, however, that one question in the survey touched on a matter of public concern-whether any assistant district attorney had ever felt pressured to work in political campaigns.78 Thus, because the survey contributed to
Connick's decision to discharge Myers, the Court determined
that it must perform a balancing analysis."
The Court emphasized that the "Pickeringbalance requires
full consideration of the government's interest in the effective80
and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public."
Moreover, the Court asserted that the nature of the employee's
expression, which a court must determine before conducting
the Pickering balancing analysis, will directly affect the state's
burden of justifying the sanctioning of employee speech. 8

76

Id.

at 147-48.

Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. The Court never explicitly analyzed the survey
through the "content, form, and context" criteria. Instead, Justice White analyzed
Myers's motive for distributing the survey, claiming that her desire was not to
inform the public about the policies of the District Attorney's office, but merely to
"gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors." Id. Of
course this determination was irrelevant, as first amendment protection is based
on the employee's speech, not the employee's motive.
"' Id. at 149. Justice White claimed that "official pressure upon employees to
work for political candidates not of the worker's own choice constitutes a coercion
of belief in violation of fundamental constitutional rights [of freedom of association]." Id. (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) and Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976)). He did not explain why the Constitution prohibits a government employer from pressuring a public employee to work for office supported
candidates in political campaigns, but does not prohibit that government employer
from discharging an employee who merely questions such a policy through speech.
79

Id.
Id. at 150.

"Id. Justice White claimed that "Pickeringunmistakably states . . .that the
state's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the na-
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Since the majority had already determined that Myers's survey
only superficially addressed a matter of public concern, it
would afford much greater judicial deference to Connickes decision and his justifications for the dismissal.' The Court thus
concluded that "[t]he limited first amendment interest involved
here does not require that Connick tolerate action which he
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his
authority, and destroy close working relationships.'
Connick focused the attention of lower courts squarely on
the interests of government employers. After Connick, these
interests included not only efficiently discharging official duties, but also preventing disruption in the workplace and maintaining proper discipline among subordinates." More importantly, the Connick Court held that these interests may justify
employment decisions predicated on employee speech which
only potentially disrupted the workplace. In Rankin v.
McPherson," however, the Court retreated somewhat from
this conclusion.
The dispute in Rankin concerned nineteen-year old Ardith
McPherson, who served as a "deputy constable" for Harris
County, TexasY Her primary responsibility was to perform
secretarial functions.' While sitting in a private room in the
ture of the employee's expression." Id. See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying
text.
' The majority thus claimed that a 'stronger showing may be necessary if the
employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.! Connick,
461 U.S. at 152.
"Id, at 154. This language summarized the Court's new rule concerning a
government employer's justification for sanctioning employee speech-an employer

must only reasonably believe that the employee's speech will affect the employer's
efficient discharge of its responsibilities to justify dismissal.
Id, at 150-51.

Id. at 154. The Waters Court would incorporate this ' potentially disruptive"
rationale directly into the Connick balancing analysis. See infra notes 167-172 and
251-259 and accompanying text.
483 U.S. 378 (1987).

"The county considered every person who worked for the Constabl's office to
be a deputy constable, regardless of job function. Id. at 380.
The Court described IcPherson's responsibilities as follows:
She was not a commissioned peace officer, did not wear a uniform, and

was not authorized to make arrests or permitted to carry a gun.
McPherson's duties were purely clerical- Her work station was a de3k at
which there was no telephone, in a room to which the public did not
have ready access. Her job was to type data from court papers into a
computer that maintained an automated record of the status of civil
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back of the stationhouse, McPherson heard a report on the
office radio that President Reagan had been shot. Another
deputy constable overheard McPherson say, "[Ihf they go for
him again, I hope they get him." 9 Constable Rankin was told
about the remark and summoned McPherson to discuss it with
her. When McPherson admitted making the remark, Rankin
promptly fired her.
In order to determine whether Constable Rankin had discharged McPherson in violation of the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court conducted the Connick balancing analysis."
The majority held that McPherson's statement, made during a
conversation about the policies of the President's administration, clearly addressed a matter of public concern. 9 The Court
concluded that Rankin had failed to demonstrate a government
interest sufficient to outweigh McPherson's first amendment
rights. 2 Thus, the majority held that "[gliven the function of
process in the county. Her training consisted of two days of instruction
in the operation of her computer terminal.
Id. at 380-81.
8 Id.
McPherson testified at trial that she had indeed uttered this remark. Id.
McPherson also testified that she commented on the President's policies concerning
welfare, medicaid benefits and food stamps. Id.
' Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, characterized the Connick balancing test as a requirement which serves "to accommodate the dual role of the pub.
lic employer as a provider of public services and as a government entity operating
under the constraints of the First Amendment." Id. at 384. He claimed that a
government employer providing "public services" should not encounter the same
rigorous judicial scrutiny of its employment decisions as it would in its capacity as
"entity." Justice Marshall maintained that this discrepancy in the level of judicial
scrutiny was necessary because review of every government-employer personnel
decision could eventually "hamper the performance of public functions" Id. Nevertheless, the majority did not entirely remove these decisions from the realm of
judicial scrutiny: "Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not
use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public
functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of the employees'
speech." Id Of course, this vigilance could only manifest itself through a judicial
standard which indeed mandated a rigorous review of all public-employee discharges predicated on speech, regardless of whether a government employer's role is
described as "provider of public services" or the more amorphous "government
entity."
" Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386. Justice Marshall observed that the "controversial
character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a
matter of public concern." Id. at 387.
' The majority stated that Connick required the Court to focus "on the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise. Interference with work, personnel relationships, or the speaker's job performance can detract from the public
employer's function; avoiding such interference can be a strong state interest."
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the agency, McPherson's position in the office, and the nature
of her statement, we are not persuaded that Rankin's interest
in discharging
her outweighed her rights under the First
93
Amendment."
D. A Doctrine in Disarray
During the twenty years between Pickering and Rankin,
the Supreme Court modified both the nature of public-employee speech rights and the scope of judicial review of government-employer decisions affecting those rights. Public employees seeking to vindicate their right to speak freely in the
workplace faced an ever-increasing number of substantive and
evidentiary hurdles. Building on precedent, the Court created
five distinct categories of public-employee speech, only two of
which were deemed worthy of genuine first amendment protection. Barring the existence of a statutory or contractual relationship with its employees, the Constitution permits a government employer to discharge a public employee for speech that:
(1) concerns a matter of purely private interest; (2) address-

McPherson, 483 U.S. at 388. The majority proceeded sun sponte to search for
evidence that McPherson's speech had in any way disrupted the Constable office
or affected the efficient discharge of the Constable's responsibilities, despite the
fact that "Constable Rankin testified that the possibility of interference with the
functions of the Constable's office had not been a consideration in his discharge of
[McPherson] and that he did not even inquire whether the remark had disrupted
the work of the office." Id. at 388-89.
1I& at 392. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia claimed that Mchorcon's
speech did not touch on a matter of public concern and thus failed the threshold
requirement of Connick. Id. at 396. He agreed with the district court's finding that
McPherson's speech was "a voicing of the hope that, next time, the Pre3ident
would be killed!' Id. This speech was a "far cry" from the speech which the Court
had considered in Connick, Pickering, Mount Healthy and Givhan. Id. Moreover,
"[Rankin's] interest in preventing the expression of such statements in his agency
outweighed her first amendment interest in making the statement Id. at 399.
Justice Scalia viewed the majority opinion as creating a new class of public employees whose speech is always protected because of their status as
"nonpolicymaking" employees. Id. at 393. It appears that Justice Scalia would
rather always protect the government's employment decisions from constitutional
scrutiny simply because of the government's status as "employer.'
" See Connick v. Mlyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). It is necessary to distin-

guish between employee speech that addresses matters of personal concern and
employee speech that addresses matters of public concern but which is utterd in
private. The Court has consistently held that the First Amendment protects only
the latter speech. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-87 n.11 (1987) ('The
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es a matter of public concern but hinders the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise;" or (3) addresses matters of both public and private concern and limits the effective
functioning of the public employer's enterprise." The First
Amendment will only protect a public employee's speech when
it: (1) addresses a matter of public concern and is nondisruptive;97 or (2) addresses matters of private and public
concern and is nondisruptive." The critical factor in the
Court's analysis is the protection of the government-employer's
efficiency interests. The recent Supreme Court decision in
Waters v. Churchill99 continues to explore this factor while
further limiting the right of public employees to speak freely.
II. WATERS V. CHURCHILL

A. Background
On October 25, 1982, Cheryl Churchill was hired as a
part-time obstetrical nurse at McDonough District Hospital
("MDII), a municipal hospital located in Macomb, Illinois and
incorporated under state law.' 0 Churchill continued to work

private nature of the [employee's] statement does not . . . vitiate the status of the
statement as addressing a matter of public concern."); Givhan v. Western Line
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (first amendment protection applies when a
public employee speaks privately with an employer on issues of public concern).
" Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
Id. Under these situations, a court would apply the two-part causation anal.
ysis of Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text. Of course, this analysis need not be
reached at all if the government employer initially convinces a court that the
speech, although protected, was potentially disruptive. See discussion infra text
accompanying notes 240-259.
' Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1890-91 (1994).
" Once again, the government employer has the opportunity to absolve itself of
any wrongdoing in these situations under the Mount Healthy analysis. See supra
text accompanying notes 54-57.
"9 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
10' Supreme Court Brief of Respondents at 1, Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct.
1878 (1994) (No. 92-1450), 1993 WL 433051 [hereinafter Brief of Respondents].
Churchill's initial status as a part-time employee had significant impact on the
reasoning of the district court, which viewed the conflict primarily as involving
whether Churchill could legally enforce an expectation of continued employment
pursuant to Illinois contract law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Churchill v. Waters, 731 F. Supp 311, 318 (C.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd,
977 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
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as a part-time employee in the Obstetrics Department until
September 16, 1985, when she began serving in a full-time
capacity. 1 ' Churchill received performance evaluations every
six months that rated her performance in approximately fifty
categories. 1' During the period between October 1982 and
December 1985, Churchill demonstrated continued improvement in her work. In fact, a December 1985 evaluation written
by Cynthia Waters, Churchill's supervisor, indicated that she
had improved to above-standard performance in every category.'
In the space on the evaluation form for "additional
evaluator's comments," Waters noted that "Cheryl has a very
bubbly contagious sense of humor most times."104
In April 1986, MDH hired Kathy Davis as Vice President
of Nursing.' Davis soon implemented new administrative
policies affecting nurse staffing and training throughout MDH,
including a policy known as "cross-training." ' From its inception, cross-training was a controversial policy that generated much discussion and debate among the medical and nursing staff of MDH.' ° Churchill vocalized her opposition to the
new policy, as did the clinical head of the Obstetrics Department, Dr. Thomas Koch."8 In June 1986, Churchill received
her first performance evaluation subsequent to the implementation of the cross-training policy.0 9 This evaluation noted a

'

* Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 312.
Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct

1878 (1994).

*o"Id.
Churchi, 731 F. Supp. at 312.
Id, Cross-training involved the transfer of full-time nurses to different specialized departments within the hospital from those in which they were normally
assigned. Nurses were provided with additional training in the new departments.
'5
1D

Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1116. They could then be transferred easily between the

various MDH departments whenever staff shortages existed in a particular area,
thus providing the hospital with more fleibility in its staing requirements. As
the supervising obstetrics nurse, Waters was responsible for the implementation of
the new crss-training policy within the department. Brief of Respondents, supra

note 100, at 2.
Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 312.
ChurchiU, 977 F.2d at 1116-17. Churchill and Dr. Koch had developed a

close relationship by the summer of 1986 and were perceived by the hospital administration as "professional allies" in the controversy concerning cross-training. Id.
at 1117.
"' Id

at 1116.
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marked deterioration in Churchill's performance, with a belowstandard rating in three of the fifty categories."0
On August 21, 1986, a "code pink" emergency occurred in
the Obstetrics Department during a caesarean section that Dr.
Koch was performing."' Dr. Koch ordered Churchill to assist
him with the emergency procedure, and Churchill remained in
the operating room until he successfully delivered the baby
and the emergency abated. Churchill briefly left the operating
room to check on the status of another patient who was under
her care."2 While Churchill performed this task, Waters entered the operating room. Churchill returned to the operating
room to complete the necessary paperwork for the emergency
patient."' Waters then ordered Churchill to check on the other patient." 4 Churchill stopped doing the paperwork and told
Waters that "[y]ou don't have to tell me how to do my job."
Nevertheless, Churchill responded to Waters's order and again
went to check on her patient." 6 Dr. Koch reprimanded Waters for interfering with his orders to Churchill. After leaving
the operating room, he approached Waters to discuss the incident in more detail. Waters refused to talk with Dr. Koch
about the confrontation and instead contacted Stephen Hopper,
the President and Chief Executive Officer of MDH." 7
In a meeting held among Dr. Koch, Waters and Hopper,
Dr. Koch criticized not only the behavior of Waters in the operating room but also the new cross-training policy that Davis
and Waters had implemented."' At a follow-up meeting the
next day, Hopper, Davis and Waters discussed Churchill's
comment made in response to Waters's order, and decided to
discipline Churchill by issuing her a "written warning" for insubordination."'
no Id.
" A code pink is a warning given at MDH to indicate that an emergency situation exists in the Obstetrics Department involving the life of a baby, its mother,
or both. Id. at 1117 n.2. All available personnel must report to the room to render
assistance. Id.
12 Id.
at 1117.
Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1117.
Id. at 1117.
US Id. at 1118.
no Id. at 1117.
3

1,

n' Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 313.
nS Id. at 313.

" Id. The written warning was part of MDH's established procedures concern-
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In January 1987, Churchill received her annual performance evaluation from Waters.' This evaluation, unlike the
evaluation six months earlier, indicated that her performance
had again earned above-standard ratings in every category."
At the end of the evaluation, however, Waters included handwritten comments critical of Churchill's attitude and behavior.? When Waters and Churchill met in person to discuss
the evaluation, Waters did not mention the handwritten comments she had included in the evaluation.
On January 16, 1987, Churchill and a cross-trainee,
Melanie Perkins-Graham, took a break from their shifts and
retired to a kitchen area located behind the main nurse's station of the Obstetrics Department. Dr. Koch soon entered
the department and joined them in conversation at their table.
Nurses Jean Welty and Mary Lou Ballew, who remained at the
main station, each overheard parts of the conversation.'
Welty overheard Perkins-Graham remark to Dr. Koch that despite her current status as a cross-trainee, she had been thinking about permanently transferring to the Obstetrics Department. Dr. Koch discussed his prior criticisms of the crosstraining policy generally and its implementation by Davis in
particular. Churchill agreed with Dr. Koch and stated that
ing the discipline of its employees. It usually followed 'verbal counseling" to the

employee by the appropriate supervisor. Churchil!, 977 F.2d at 1118 n.5.
In the warning Waters issued to Churchill, she claimed that Churchill "had to
be asked twice to leave the delivery room," and exhibited a '[gleneral negative
attitude and lack of support toward nursing administration. . .! Churchill, 731 F.
Supp. at 313. Although Churchill could have replied to the warning either orally
or in writing, or filed a grievance protesting this warning, she did not. Id.
Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 313.

32

U1 Id.
Id. The full comments read:
Cheryl exhibits negative behavior

towards

me

and

my

leader-

ship-through her actions and body language, Le., no answer, one word
abrupt answers followed by turning and leaving, blank facial expressiona,
or disapproving facial expressions. This promotes an unpleasant atmosphere and hinders constructive communication and cooperation.

Id.
222 Id.
When MEDIH terminated Churchill's employment, it considered these critical comments to be the second written warning issued to Churchill pursuant to its
Rules of Dismissal. Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1118.

"2Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 313-14.
126

Id, at 314.

n6 Id=7 Id,
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the cross-training policy was going to "ruin the hospital."' '
Welty also heard Churchill encourage Perkins-Graham to ignore rumors of Waters's reputation as a difficult boss, because
Waters had a "hard job" that could make her moody.129
Although Welty overheard most of the conversation among
Dr. Koch, Churchill and Perkins-Graham, she did not report it
to Waters. Nurse Ballew, who overheard only fragments of this
conversation, "construed those portions she [did hear] as negative and intended to dampen the enthusiasm of... PerkinsGraham," and reported the incident to Waters.' On January
23, Davis conducted a meeting with Waters, Hopper and
Perkins-Graham to discuss the nature of the conversation.'
Perkins-Graham agreed that Churchill's comments about Waters seemed negative and inappropriate, and that Churchill
had indeed criticized the new MDH policies within the Obstetrics Department. At a subsequent meeting held on January
26, Davis and Waters decided to ask Hopper to terminate
Churchill's employment, despite never interviewing Churchill,
Dr. Koch or Nurse Welty regarding the conversation." When
Churchill arrived for work the following day, Waters informed
her that she was fired because of her "continued underminfing]
of the department and the hospital administration."134 Churchill filed a grievance in accordance with hospital procedure,
but MDH upheld the discharge. 5
Churchill then brought an action in federal district
court 3' under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and state law."3 She
"' Id. Churchill further claimed that Davis's "administrative decisions seemed to
be impeding nursing care." Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1118,
" Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 314.
130
131

Id.
Id.

"' Id. Perkins-Graham also mentioned Churchill's comment about Davis "ruining
the hospital." Id.
I Id. Both Dr. Koch and Nurse Welty indicated that "they would have supported Churchill's version of the incident." Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1118-19.
12

Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 314.

Id. Hopper reviewed the grievance and decided that MDIR supervisors had
issued Churchill three warnings concerning her behavior, which were enough to
satisfy MDR disciplinary guidelines and warrant dismissal. Id. The first was the
written warning following the operating room incident, the second was Waters's
criticism of Churchill in the evaluation, and the third was the January 16 con.
versation between Churchill and Perkins-Graham. Id.
126 Id. at 311. Churchill joined Waters, Davis, Hopper and MDII
as defendants
in the suit.
12

1

Section 1983 states:
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claimed that termination of her nursing position at MDH violated her first and fourteenth amendment rights and breached
her employment contract.s Churchill asserted that MDH
had violated her first amendment freedom of speech and due
process rights when it discharged her on the basis of speech
without first determining if the Constitution actually protected
that speech. 9 The district court granted MDHIs motion for
summary judgment on Churchill's free speech claim, holding
that:
Churchill's statements were not protected speech as a matter of law,
and even if they were, the hospital's interest in maintaining harmony among the workers and encouraging good working relationships

among the employees and supervisors outweighed Churchill's interest in expressing her opposition to the cross-training policy to her

co-worker.14

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
"2 Churchill, 731 F. Supp. at 31L The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment on all counts. The district court determined that Churchill could
sustain her wrongful termination claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if AIDH's employee handbook created a "legally enforceable expectation of continued employment." Id. at 318. After examining the handbook, the district court found that none of its provisions contained "clear promises"
to an employee sufficient to justify a reasonable expectation of continued employment, such as specific terms defining how an individual was to become a permanent member of the staff or explicit mandatory procedures governing the termina-

tion of employees. Id. at 319. Moreover, the handbook included a disclaimer "expressly disavowuing] any intent to be bound," since the contents were 'presented
as a matter of information only" and "were not to be considered conditions of
employment." I&L The district court concluded that the handbook could not, as a
whole, be read to constitute a promise of employment upon which Churchill could
reasonably rely. Id. The court therefore held that Churchill did not have an enforceable property interest in her employment, and could not "proceed on her due
process claim and [thus] summary judgment would be proper on this basis alone."
Id. at 320.
'9 Id. Churchill contended that the speech indeed addressed a matter of public
concern-namely, the effect of the cross-training policy on hospital care. Id.
140 Churchill, 977 F.2d. at 1120. The district court also dismissed Churchill's
freedom of expressive association claim and denied her partial summary judgment
motion on the first amendment due process claim. Id.
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B. The Seventh CircuitDecision
In reversing the district court's judgment on Churchill's
first amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit held that Churchill
had introduced enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the
First Amendment did protect her speech, and that MDFI indeed had violated her free speech rights if it fired her on the
basis of that speech.' The court of appeals also determined
that mere "unawareness" of the protected status of the
employee's speech would not insulate a government employer
from constitutional liability." Based on Churchill's version
the Court found that Churchill's conversation
of events,
with Dr. Koch and Perkins-Graham undoubtedly touched on
matters of public concern, as it addressed both potential violations of state nursing regulations and the quality and level of
Furthermore,
nursing care provided to patients at MD.
the Seventh Circuit concluded that "when a public employer
fires an employee for engaging in speech, and that speech is
later found to be protected under the First Amendment, the
employer is liable for violating the employee's free-speech
rights regardless of what the employer knew at the time of
termination." 145 The court of appeals recognized the "delicate
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1128.
" On an appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court "must
view the record and all inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962).
"' Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1122.
"' Id. at 1127. The Seventh Circuit did not find it necessary to "create a first
amendment due process right in order to protect the rights of public employees to
speak out on matters of public concern, for we believe that Mount Healthy provides adequate safeguards regardless of whether the employer actually knew the
precise content of the statements for which it fired the employee." Id. at 1126.
The "adequate safeguards" to which the court refers is the requirement in Mount
Healthy that a government employer demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the employee's termina.
tion] even in the absence of the protected conduct." Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). See supra text accompanying
notes 46-57. While the court of appeals acknowledged that the "point" of Mount
Healthy is the "protected conduct," Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1127, Mount Healthy
nevertheless requires a public employee to first prove the speech was indeed pro.
tected and played a substantial role in the employer's decision. Mount Healthy,
4

2
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balance" between hospital administrators, supervisors and
staff, but emphasized that employment decisions cannot be
constitumade which prevent employees from expressing "their146
concern."
public
of
matters
on
views
protected
tionally
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit. In a
plurality opinion, the Court held that lower courts must apply
the balancing test articulated in Connick 47 to the speech that
the government employer reasonably believed the employee
spoke after conducting an investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the speech. The plurality eschewed any attempt at clarifying when such an investigation is constitutionally mandated, reconciling itself to answering this question on
an ad hoc basis.' The Court stated only that any investigatory procedure the government employer uses must be "reasonable" under the circumstances and yield "reasonable" conclu-

429 U.S. at 284.
'"
Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1129.
147 The Connick balancing test, as framed by Justice O'Connor, stated that in
order for the speech of a public employee to be protected by the First Amendment.
the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the employee's
interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be outweighed by
any injury the speech could cause to "the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."
Id. at 1884 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))). See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
I Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888.89 (plurality opinion). Curiously, the Court
claimed that a conflict had existed among the Circuits on this issue prior to Waters. In the cases cited by the Court, however, the actual content of the employee's
speech was easily identifiable and thus not a genuine issue in dispute. See Sims
v. Metropolitan Dade Cty., 972 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1992) (employee discharged
after delivering sermon in front of a crowded congregation which was also subsequently reported in a local newspaper); Wulf v. Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir.
1989) (police officer discharged for writing letter to Attorney General alleging department misconduct); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979)
(county probation officer discharged for writing letter to Assistant County Attorney
alleging misappropriation of funds by coworkers). These cases differ from Waters,
where the parties disputed the content of Churchill's conversation with Dr. Koch
and Perkins-Graham and thus a jury would have to conduct its own factual inquiry into Churchill's speech.
' Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1885.86 (plurality opinion).
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sions.'
If the government employer satisfies these conditions, the Court explained, the judiciary should defer to employment decisions made pursuant to the investigation. In this
way, the government, acting in its capacity as employer rather
than as sovereign, could achieve its goals in the most efficient
and effective manner possible, without excessive interference
from a judge or jury invoking strict first amendment protection. 15'
Two concurring opinions attempted to clarify the plurality
opinion. The first concluded that the government employer
would be constitutionally liable to an employee if it did not
actually believe the results of its reasonable investigation. The
second claimed that the investigation requirement was a constitutionally unnecessary burden upon the government employers given their ability to fire employees for any reason except
retaliation for speech on a matter of public concern. Finally, a
dissenting opinion asserted that government employers do not
require an additional layer of judicial deference in order to
protect their efficiency interests, and that a jury, and not the
government employer, must independently evaluate the
employee's speech in order to safeguard adequately public-employee first amendment rights.
1. The Plurality
Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Souter and Ginsburg, maintained
that the primary issue in Waters was whether lower courts
should apply the Connick balancing test either to what the
government employer thought its employee said or to what a
jury ultimately determined the employee said.'52 According to
Justice O'Connor, a government employer is not only in a better position than a jury to determine what an employee said,
but is also under a constitutional duty to do so."5
The plurality asserted that the First Amendment requires
a government employer to protect the substantive free speech

"' Id. at 1889.
1 Id.
IS2 Id.
3

Id.

at 1888.
at 1882.
at 1886-87.
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rights of its employees through "reliable procedures"-i.e.,
through investigations, conducted by the employer prior to

discharging an employee, that would determine whether the
employee had indeed engaged in constitutionally protected

speech.TM

According to the plurality, however, the First

Amendment does not require a government employer to utilize
every procedure that could conceivably safeguard protected

speech." Deciding which, if any, procedure was constitutionally required in a particular employment situation involves the

consideration of "a different mix of administrative burden, risk
of erroneous punishment of protected speech, and risk of erro-

neous exculpation of unprotected speech."'

Thus, while Jus-

tice O'Connor asserted that the First Amendment creates a

"strong presumption" against even the honest punishment of
an employee's protected speech, she concluded that a court is

" Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1884 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor claimed that
the Court has "often held some procedures-a particular allocation of the burden
of proof; a particular quantum of proof, a particular type of appellate review, and
so on-to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected
speech." Id. In support of this proposition, the Court cited a number of cases involving certain judicial procedures utilized to protect speech from defamation suits.
Masson v. New Yorker Mlagazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (speech is constitutionally protected against libel unless clear and convincing evidence establishes mal-

ice); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepp, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (burden of proving that potentially libelous speech is false falls on plaintiff); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 485 (1984) (appellate court judge
must exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes
actual malice with convincing clarity). In each of these case% the speech in question is presumptively constitutional unless the opposing party can establish enough
evidence to rebut the presumption. There is no such presumption for employee
speech in Waters; in fact, the Waters Court makes clear that employee speech is
presumptively deleterious to the government employer's efficency interests and
thus deserves minimal constitutional protection.
Nevertheless, the Court's holding in Waters ultimately does not require a
government employer to use a "reliable" procedure when determining if it can
sanction an employee's speech in a particular situation without offending the First
Amendment. The Court only requires a government employer to use a 'reasonable"
procedure, a much less accurate standard of constitutional protection.
I Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1885 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor admitted
that "the [analysis] adopted by the Court of Appeals may lower the chance of
protected speech being erroneously punished. A speaker is more protected if she

has two opportunities to be vindicated-first by the employer's investigation and
then by the jury-than just one." Id. The Court did not explain why an employee's
speech would need to be vindicated through any procedure, whether nogjudicial or
judicial, if the free speech clause already fully protected it from encroachment by
the government employer.
15 Id. at 1885.
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required to uphold the presumption in such
not automatically
157
cases.

Instead, Justice O'Connor observed that a court must
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the First Amendment
compels the government employer to conduct an investigation.
She noted that a variety of factors are present in different
situations-most notably the cost incurred by the government
in implementing a review procedure and the likelihood of a
procedure's projected success in protecting the constitutional
rights of the employee.158 More importantly, a court should
evaluate these factors in light of the premise, which the Court
assumed to be correct, that "the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as
sovereign."' Justice O'Connor claimed that when the government acts against free speech in its role as employer, greater deference must be paid to its predictions of harm resulting
from employee speech, even if that speech involves a matter of
public concern. 60 Such deference is inapplicable, she noted,
when the government acts against free speech in its role as
sovereign."'
The plurality therefore determined that a reduced level of
judicial scrutiny was appropriate when the government restrained free speech in its role as employer rather than as

"TId. Justice O'Connor agreed that the Constitution protects, and even encourages, free discourse and debate among private citizens, citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (freedom of speech permits "tumult, discord, and even

offensive utterance," as "necessary side effects of.

.

. the process of open debate.");

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (the "fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones."); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270

(1964) (there is a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."). Waters, 114 S. Ct. at
1886 (plurality opinion). However, she also asserted that this broad range of substantive freedom of expression was inapplicable in the public-employee context. Id.
In support of this proposition, the plurality cited Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); and Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947). By analogy, Justice O'Connor reasoned that any first amendment right to

an investigation that a public employee may have should also be similarly limited.
Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1886-87 (plurality opinion).
08 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1885-86 (plurality opinion).
' Id. at 1886 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). Of
course Pickering itself had presumed the correctness of this premise.
16' Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887 (plurality opinion).
161 Id.
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sovereign."' Justice O'Connor based this limited scrutiny "on
the nature of the government's mission as employer." "' According to the plurality, the mission of each government agency or entity is to perform the particular tasks for which it is
responsible in the most effective and efficient manner possible.1 A government employer must be allowed to restrain its
employees when they engage in conduct that frustrates those
tasks.' Justice O'Connor concluded that in order for lower
courts to conduct a proper first amendment analysis of government employment decisions, they must adhere to the fundamental principle that "[t]he government's interest in achieving
its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated
from a relatively subordinate interest when it"acts as sovereign
to a significant one when it acts as employer. 166
The Court summarily rejected the approach of the court of
appeals, under which lower courts would apply the Connick
balancing test to the employee's speech as determined by a
"' This approach, the Court stated, would "force the govjury.67
ernment employer to come to its factual conclusions through
procedures that substantially mirror the evidentiary rules used
in court.""s Justice O'Connor argued that the better method
is to apply the Connick test to that speech which the government employer reasonably believed the employee uttered.'
In this way, a government employer could make employment
decisions based on information available at the time of the
questionable speech. The employer may consider knowledge of
the employee's character, hearsay and past conduct-factors
which may not be available to a jury when it is called upon to
reconstruct the events leading to the government action."'

N2

"

Id,
Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888 (plurality opinion). Curiously, Justice O'Connor

used the example of a governor who fires an opinionated deputy to illustrate this
proposition. A deputy working with the governor is in a much different employeeemployer relationship than a nurse employed by a large municipal hospital, or a

teacher employed by a local school board. See discussion infra text acompanying
notes 221-230.
c Id. at 1888.

Id,
9 Id, at 1889.
170 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888 (plurality opinion).
as

1086

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 1055

Moreover, a government employer that is able to act upon its
own conclusions of fact can more easily assure that an
employee's speech is not disruptive and improper."'7 Justice
O'Connor concluded that while this approach may "involve
some risk of erroneously punishing protected speech," the First
Amendment does not require a government employer to adopt
the stringent evidentiary procedures used by courts. 2
The Court insisted, however, that the resulting heightened
deference to decisions made by the government acting as employer would not always overcome countervailing first amendment concerns. 3 Justice O'Connor recognized that public
employees are typically in the unique position of knowing what
is wrong with the government agency that employs them, and
that these "informed opinions" are necessary for enhancing
public debate. 4 In these situations, the government must
make a "substantial showing" that the speech will indeed be
disruptive before it can act against the speaker. 5
Additionally, under the plurality's approach, courts would
still consider the "reasonableness of the employer's conclusions" in order to ensure that the employer made its decision
in good faith and not as a pretext. 6 Justice O'Connor noted
that in any given situation a defendant must meet the standard of a reasonable government employer in similar circumstances. Thus, if a reasonable employer would believe that the
First Amendment likely protected the employee's speech, the
defendant should demonstrate "a certain amount of care" in its
actions. 7 7 This care must manifest itself in the type of procedure used by the government employer before making an employment decision based on the speech involved in the particular case. 8 Such reasonable care is required regardless of
whether the employee has a protected property interest in her
job. 9 In situations where employers could reasonably utilize
171 Id.
172 Id.

3 Id. at 1887.
Id.
176Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887 (plurality opinion) (citing Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987), Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983), and
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-71 (1968)).
'76 Id. at 1889.
174

177Id.
178
171

Id.
Id. For a discussion on what constitutes a protected property interest, see
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a number of different procedures, however, "[o]nly procedures
outside the range of what a reasonable manager would use
may be condemned as unreasonable.""'
The Court analyzed the circumstances surrounding
Churchill's discharge according to this new first amendment
methodology.18 ' The plurality emphasized that Waters and
Davis formally interviewed both Perkins-Graham and Ballew
after Ballew reported the critical conversation, while Hopper
interviewed Churchill to "hear her side of the story.Y'8 According to the Court, if this investigation led MDH to believe
that Churchill had engaged in constitutionally unprotected
speech, and could thus be discharged, this belief would be
entirely reasonable and should not be disturbed.1" Furthermore, the Court held that under the Connick test Churchill's
speech, as described by Ballew and Perkins-Graham, was not
protected.' Thus, "[s]o long as Davis and Waters discharged
Churchill only for the part of the speech that was either not on
a matter of public concern, or on a matter of public concern but
disruptive, it is irrelevant whether the rest of the speech was,
unbeknownst to them, both on a matter of public concern and
nondisruptive.1"
If, however, Davis and Waters fired Churchill because of her previous nondisruptive speech against
1VIDH's cross-training policy, and such speech was indeed protected, the hospital violated Churchill's first amendment
rights. The Court remanded the case for a determination of
that issue.

supra note 138.
' Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889 (plurality opinion).

" Justice O'Connor noted the discrepancy between Churchill's version of the

conversation with Perkins-Graham, corroborated by Dr. Koch and Nurse Welty,

and those of Nurses Ballew and Perkins-Graham, but apparently found them insignificant. Id. at 1890. The district court judge had decided the facts surrounding
Churchill's dismissal on MIDH's motion for summary judgment In reviewing the
district court's ruling, the court of appeals held that the 'the content of
[Churchill's] speech is a question of fact for the jury" and that the "district court
erred in taking it upon itself to resolve this disputed issue of material fact against

Churchill" Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1123 (7th Cir. 1992), tracated, 114
S. Ct. 1878 (1994).

Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890 (plurality opinion).

sd

~"Id

9

at 1891.
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2. Justice Souter's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter agreed with the
plurality's general premise that a government employer could
discharge an employee for his or her speech if the employer
investigated the circumstances of the speech and, relying on
that investigation, reasonably concluded that the First Amendment did not protect the speech.'8 6 He also emphasized that a
government employer will avoid constitutional liability only if
it actually believes the results of its investigation.8 7 A government employer will therefore violate the First Amendment
if it acts against an employee "believ[ing] or genuinely suspect[ing] that the employee's speech was protected in its entirety or in that part on which the employer purports to rely in
taking disciplinary action.""s Moreover, Justice Souter reiterated the warnings given by the plurality that the government
employer will be constitutionally liable if its investigation is
merely a shield for disciplinary retaliation for an employee's
past protected speech. 89
Like the plurality, Justice Souter acknowledged the tenuous constitutional balancing of the government employer's
interest in efficiently and effectively accomplishing its goals
against the public employee's interest in speaking on matters
of public concern. 9 ° He admitted that allowing a government
employer to discharge an employee based upon its own factual
investigation could have a chilling effect on public-employee
speech, but claimed that such a risk was tolerable in light of
the importance of the government employer's interests.'
18

Id.

Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1891 (Souter, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 1892.
187
18

Id.

190Id.
1 1 Id. Justice Souter again emphasized a dual requirement: (1) the employers
conduct---i.e., the procedure used to determine the nature of the employee's
speech-must be reasonable; and (2) the employer must actually believe the results
of its investigation. Id. He claimed that attaching liability to a government employer who does not satisfy both requirements maintains "respect (for] the 'longstanding recognition that the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection
of speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved
in the administration of a government office.' Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 154 (1983)). Justice Souter did not explain how the second requirement
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Nevertheless, Justice Souter determined that in this case the
petitioners would have violated the First Amendment if, after
an objectively reasonable investigation into the circumstances
surrounding Churchill's conversation with Perkins-Graham,
"they doubted the accuracy of the report[s] and fired Churchill
for speech, or for a portion of her speech, that they genuinely
suspected was nondisruptive (assuming that the speech was
actually a matter of public concern).""2 In attempting to harmonize the varying opinions of the Court, Justice Souter concluded that lower courts should adopt the plurality's reasonableness test as the holding of the Court and the appropriate
standard in public-employee speech cases.'93
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
argued that the plurality had not simply created "new procedural protections for established first amendment rights, but
rather new first amendment rights."" Justice Scalia's primary focus was not government-employer efficiency, but rather
the ambiguous role of the judge and jury under the plurality's
new standard. He explained that requiring a government employer to investigate employee speech before taking any disciplinary action simply did not comport with the Court's estab-

lished rule that an employer is constitutionally liable only for
retaliating against an employee whose speech addressed a
matter of public concern.'95 According to Justice Scalia, the
Court had always hesitated when recognizing procedural elements within the First Amendment. 96 Prior decisions, he
noted, had limited procedural requirements to those cases
involving "alleged governmental deprivation of the freedom of
speech specifically through the judicial process, in which concould be proved, or more appropriately, disproved.
1D2Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1892-93 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter noted

that this argument was available to Churchill on remand.
3s

Id- at 1893.

Id. at 1895. Justice Scalia further described the Court's opinion as "unprecedented, superfluous to the decision in the present case, unnecessary for protection
of public-employee speech on matters of public concern, and unpredictable in its
application and consequences." I&. at 1893.
" Id.
" Id. at 1894.
"'
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text procedures are necessarily central to the discussion." I
Justice Scalia warned that the plurality had created a general
constitutional principle that protected substantive speech liberties with procedures that the Court could not define."9 8
Justice Scalia next criticized the plurality's investigation
requirement on the ground that the Court's expanded concept
of "First Amendment procedure" contradicted other government employment cases decided under the due process
clause.199 He argued that under the due process line of cases,
public employees could be dismissed for any reason whatsoever, without a hearing or other type of procedural safeguard,
unless they had a protected property interest in their employment. °0 Under the plurality's standard, if a government employer wished to dismiss an employee for reasons relating to
speech, the employer must first investigate the nature and
content of the speech to determine if the First Amendment
protects it. The employer would then have to proceed in a "reasonable manner" with its employment decisions based on the
information obtained during the investigation, regardless of
whether the information was later found to be incorrect. 201 In
essence, Justice Scalia concluded, the plurality opinion converted "the government employer's first amendment liability with
for intentional
respect to 'public concern' speech from20 liability
2
wrong to liability for mere negligence."
Justice Scalia also maintained that the investigation requirement was meaningless since the government employer
still had to convince a court that the employee's discharge was
not an unconstitutional retaliation for speech addressing a
"'

Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra note 154.

"'

Id.

at 1894. Justice Scalia asserted that "[w]e never are informed how to tell

mandated speech-safeguarding procedures from nonmandated ones." Id.
" Id. (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 664, 577-78
(1972)).

Id.
Id.
202 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1895 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained
200
201

that Pickering and Connick did not require the government employer to protect
speech that touched on public concern, "but merely forbade government-employer

hostility to such speech." Id. Justice Scalia thus took the implicit holding of
Connick-the more substantially an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern, the more constitutional protection the speech will be afforded-and sought

to wield it as an explicit restraint on the power of the judiciary to review government-employer sanctions of employee speech. Id. at 1895-96.
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matter of public concern. He argued that the Court previously
had considered this showing sufficient in protecting a range of
constitutional liberties, including first amendment rights, withJustice
out having to "invent procedural requirements.'
Scalia concluded that the plurality opinion created so much
confusion for government employers regarding the potential
liabilities of the investigation requirement that "[wie will
spend decades trying to improvise the limits of this new first
amendment procedure that is unmentioned in text and unformed by tradition."'
4. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that
the plurality's reasonableness requirement could exculpate a
government employer who had wrongfully punished protected
speech, and therefore "provide[d] less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for
less exalted rights, including contractual and statutory rights
applicable in the private sector." 5 Justice Stevens maintained that this reasonableness requirement allowed a government employer to escape the consequences of a mistaken factual investigation by removing "the risk that an impartial adjudicator may come to a different conclusion."0 He observed that
the plurality's analysis permitted a constitutional violation to
go unpunished merely because the employer made a reasonable mistake about what the employee actually said, although
the First Amendment fully protected the speech." This reI Id at 1896. Justice Scalla pointed to the Mount Halthy "preponderance of
the evidence" test that a government employer must satisfy when demonstrating
the veracity of its employment decision. Id. at 1895-96. See supra note3 40-57 and
accompanying text.
=' Id. at 1897-98.

='Id. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens saw this "straightforward" case as involving two simple issues: "(1) whether the speech is protected,
and (2) whether it was the basis for the sanction imposed on the employee." Id.
Justice Stevens decided the first issue in one sentence: "Given the [procedural]
posture in which this case comes to us, we must assume that Churchi's statements were fully protected by the First Amendment." Id. As for the second issue,
Stevens claimed that "[o]ur legal system generally delegates the determination of
facts upon which important rights depend to neutral factfinders, notwithstanding
the attendant risks of error and overdeterrence." Id.
=6 Id. at 1898.
207

Taters, 114 S. Ct. at 1899 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens claimed
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sult, he asserted, illustrated the Court's preference for focusing
on the investigative procedures of the government employer
rather than on "whether the employee's freedom of speech has
Because government agencies so often
been 'abridged."'
serve as the vehicles for critical debate and deliberation on
matters of public concern, Justice Stevens concluded that any
rule which stifled this debate subverted the 'profound national
commitment' to the freedom of speech."0 9
Of all the varying analytical approaches utilized by the
Justices in Waters, only Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion
incorporates a significant consideration of public-employee
freedom of speech interests.2 10 He agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the Court's task was to apply the Connick balancing analysis. Unlike the plurality, however, Justice Stevens
would not allow a government employer to supply the factual
basis upon which to apply the Connick test. Instead, he would
require a jury to supply this factual basis.211 This approach
serves two critical functions in public-employee speech cases.
First, it "delegates the determination of facts upon which important rights depend to neutral factfinders, ' 12 thereby re-

that the reasonableness of the employer's mistake was important only in determining the employer's liability for damages, a consideration which should not "constrict the substantive reach of a public employee's right of free speech." Id. at
1899 n.5.
21 Id. at 1899-1900. The dissent criticized the plurality's emphasis on protecting
government efficiency at the expense of public employees' interests in speaking on
matters of public concern, noting that "It]he need for governmental efficiency that
so concerns the plurality is amply protected by the substantive limits on public
employees' rights of expression." Id. at 1899.
219 Id. at 1900 (citation omitted).
200 Justice Stevens begins his dissent by stating clearly the general principle
that "[e]very American has the right to express an opinion on issues of public
significance." Id. at 1898. He then focuses more specifically on public employees:
'The First Amendment . .. demands that the Government respect its employees'
freedom to express their opinions on issues of public importance." Id. Justice
Stevens's recognition of, and adherence to, these critical constitutional principles
serves to focus his analysis on a true balancing of interests, and not simply a
judicial vindication of government-employer decisionmaking.
211 The dissent noted that "[olrdinarily, when someone acts to another person's
detriment based upon a factual judgment, the actor assumes the risk that an
impartial adjudicator may come to a different conclusion." Id.
212 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens focused
on the importance of "impartial adjudicator[s]" and "the ability of juries to find the
truth" throughout his opinion, indicating his concern about the ability of a government employer to remain impartial during an investigation. Justice Stevens would,
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moving the potential for bias inherent in relying on an
employer's investigation of the facts.21 3 Second, the risk that
the neutral factfinder will arrive at a different conclusion than
the government employer serves as a potent deterrent against
violations of employee free speech." 4 The awareness of this
risk would encourage a government employer to tread cautiously when determining whether to sanction an employee
based on speech.2 5 More importantly, in order to confront
this risk efficiently and effectively, a government employer
must standardize its investigatory procedures to ensure that
the most comprehensive factfinding occurs in each situation. 6 Yet only Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's
however, likely support an approach that involved both an initial investigation by
the government employer followed by a jury's separate determination of the facts.
In this way, the government employer is motivated to "get its facts straight* before discharging an employee based on speech. Id. at 1900.
213 See id. at 1890.
214 The dissent characterized this risk as 'the normal means by which our legal
system protects legal rights and encourages those in authority to act with care."
Id. at 1900. In contrast, the plurality claimed that this risk would affect government efficiency interests by "forcrmig] the government employer to come to its
factual conclusions through procedures that substantially mirror the evidentiary
rules used in court." Id. at 1888. Accepting this premise as true, it is clear that
such a result would be necessary to protect adequately an employee's free speech
interests. In Waters, for example, IhD)H officials discharged Churchill despite never
having conducted interviews with Churchill, Dr. Koch or Nurse Welty regarding
the substance of the conversation. ItDH would not have committed such a gross
lapse in factfinding had they known that a competent trier of fact would be reviewing their actions. Moreover, LIDH would not likely have approached
Churchill's case outside the disciplinary procedures it had already promulgated in
its employee handbook.
21' Under the plurality's analysis, an employer avoids constitutional liability if
its factual conclusions are "reasonable," although mistaken. I& at 1889-90. This
reasoning is flawed because the first amendment "violation does not vanish merely
because the firing was based upon a reasonable mistake about what the employee
said." Id. at 1899. Justice Stevens properly asserts that "[tIhe reasonableness of
the public employer's mistake would, of course, bear on whether that employer
should be liable for damages." Id. at 1900 n.5 (emphasis added).
21 This result would not occur under the plurality's analysis because, as Justice
O'Connor notes, "there will often be situations in which reasonable employers
would disagree about who is to be believed, or how much investigation needs to be
done, or how much evidence is needed to come to a particular conclusion.' Id. at
1889. Thus, without the risk that a jury will arrive at a different conclusion, a
government employer has no inducement to conduct a comprehensive investigation
before discharging the employee, especially when considering the Court's "greater
deference to government predictions of harm." Id. at 1887.
Justice O'Connor claims that '[glovernment employers should be allowed to
use personnel procedures that differ from the evidentiary rules used by courts,
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dissent. The remaining Justices are content to remove the
important safeguards a neutral factfinder would provide and
permit the government employer to proffer the essentially
uncontrovertible evidence upon which courts determine publicemployee first amendment rights.
III. CHILLING PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH

The Waters Court's investigation requirement might seem
to provide public employees with constitutional protections
against retaliatory discharge, but in fact it will ensure that
most public-employee speech falls outside first amendment
protection. In the face of the ongoing and intense debate over
reforming the American health care system, a period when the
public requires informed opinions and critical discussion, the
Court chose to muzzle the voices of health care workers. More
broadly, Waters indicates the Court's willingness to replace a
genuine balancing analysis of public-employee first amendment
rights and government-employer efficiency interests with an
approach that defers to employer decisionmaking regarding the
workplace.
Before Waters, a court would conduct a three-step analysis
to determine the constitutionality of an employee's discharge
based on speech. First, Connick and Mount Healthy required
an employee to demonstrate that his or her speech addressed a
matter of public concern and also was a substantial factor in
the employer's sanctioning decision.217 Second, if the
employee's speech was found to address matters of public concern, the court would balance the interests of the government
employer in efficiently discharging its responsibilities against

without fear that these differences will lead to liability." Id. at 1888. This approach, however, focuses on the efficacy of the investigation requirement only in
relation to its burden on the employer's efficiency and liability interests, and not
to its vindication of the employee's free speech interests.
317 To accomplish this task, the court would use the "content, form and contextV
analysis described in Connick. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)
and supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. In addition, Connick required a
court to determine whether the speech addressed a matter of significant public
concern or a matter of lesser importance, which affected the government
employer's burden of justifying its employment decision. Id. at 150. The public
concern determination was an issue of law; the substantial factor determination
was an issue of fact.
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the employee's interests in speaking on these matters."' Finally, if the court found that the employee's speech did not
hinder government-employer efficiency, it applied the Mount
Healthy causation analysis to determine whether the employer
indeed had discharged the employee for constitutionally protected speech.219 In essence, courts conducted this analysis to
determine the substantive scope of the public employee's
speech rights in a particular situation and whether those
rights had been violated.
Under this analytical framework, lower courts had the
power to scrutinize an employer's justifications for discharging
an employee and exercise meaningful judicial review. After
Waters, however, a government employer decides for itself
whether the First Amendment protects employee speech and,
in most cases, will therefore be free from contradiction by a
neutral factflnder.' While Justice O'Connor could not articulate a consistent constitutional principle to guide lower courts
and public employers and employees in future cases, Waters
makes it clear that a majority of the Court will permit government employers to define the contours of public-employee
speech and its attendant first amendment protection.
A. PhilosophicalConsiderations
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated
whether it subscribes to a particular first amendment philosophy regarding freedom of speech, its narrow view of publicemployee speech seems to emphasize social utility." Begin'1 A

court satisfied this inquiry by examining the "manner, time, and place' in
which the employee speech was made. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. SChL Dist,
439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979). Another consideration was that "Pickering
unnistakenly states ... that the State's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression. Conniek,
461 U.S. at 150.
" See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
-21 If the employer has conducted an investigation, and the Court dtermine3
that a reasonable employer could believe the results, the employment decision does
not violate the employee's first amendment rights, regardless of whether a court
arrives at a different conclusion concerning the protected nature of the speech. See
supra text accompanying notes 167-177.
11
The Connick Court came closest to ackmowledging its adherence to this philosophy, claiming that:
[when employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any
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ning with Pickering,the Court has consistently limited a public
employee's right to speak in the workplace to "matters of public concern." Connick and Rankin forced employees to prove
that their speech addressed a matter of public concern before
the Court would even consider whether the employer had violated their first amendment rights.' While Givhan held that
there is no distinction between employee speech on a matter of
public concern delivered publicly or privately,' Connick implemented the use of a sliding scale to "grade" speech which is
found to address matters of public concern.' Speech which

matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
2 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Supreme Court
has never defined "public concern" with any precision, but has chosen instead to
determine on an ad hoc basis whether an employee's speech addresses more than
a mere "private concern-another term which has escaped definition.
One commentator has described the substantial difficulties that the Court's
public-concern standard poses in free speech cases:
First, and most significant, is that defining a "public concern" is subjective. For example, is one woman employee's request for parental leave a
matter of public concern? Does this answer change if she discusses her
dilemma with a local news reporter who prints the story in the paper? Is
the transfer of one employee a matter of public concern? The transfer of
ten employees? Of one black employee? Is a complaint about wages a
matter of public concern? A complaint about vacation time? Reciting that
the aim of the first amendment is to protect the unfettered exchange of
ideas for social and political change does not help us decide which, if
any, of these complaints is within the amendment.
Massaro, supra note 9, at 27-28.
Lower federal courts have quite divergent views on what type of employee
speech constitutes a matter of public concern. See Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983 Actions, 115-20 (June
1995), available in Westlaw, C108 ALI-ABA 33, for a list of representative cases.
See supra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
The Court has never stated explicitly whether the employee's speech must address a matter of public concern of which the employee has intimate knowledge or
substantial information. Pickering indicates that an employee should have special
knowledge. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72. Rankin, however, suggests that an employee may speak on issues of general public importance in the workplace without
interference from the government employer. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
386-88 (1987).
24 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
22 See supra text accompanying notes 75-85.
In Justice Brennan's dissent in Connick, he explained that:
[t]he proper means to ensure that the courts are not swamped with routine employee grievances mischaracterized as First Amendment cases is
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the Court considers to be of less concern to the public is afforded less constitutional protection.
If the Court cannot articulate a workable definition of
"public concern," or refuses to categorize issues as involving
"public concern" or "private concern," it certainly should not
expect that government employers will have greater success.
And it is critical to ascertain exactly what the employee said,
because according to Connick, "a stronger showing [of office
disruption] may be necessary if the employee's speech more
Thus, a
substantially involved matters of public concern.'
government employer which concluded after an investigation
that an employee's speech squarely addressed a matter of public concern would need to exercise more caution before discharging the employee. Yet because the Court does not want to
involve itself in what it perceives to be primarily intra-office
disputes, it is willing to construe "public concern" quite narrowly. The Court therefore deems public-employee speech like
Cheryl Churchill's as addressing only matters of private concern, which sufficiently insulates an employer's actions from
constitutional liability while denying an employee's speech adequate constitutional protection.
Yet Churchill's speech, like the teacher's criticisms of desegregation in Givhan, undoubtedly addressed more than personal gripes about her relationship with supervisors. MDH's
new cross-training policy represented a fundamental change in
the manner inwhich the hospital provided nursing care to its
patients, and therefore generated considerable discussion,
debate and conflict among hospital personnel. The possibility
that a public hospital is incorrectly implementing a new training policy, or that such a policy may threaten the quality of
health care that the hospital provides to its patients, certainly
qualifies as a matter of public concern.' Churchill's convernot to restrict artificially the concept of "public concern,* but to require
that adequate weight be given to the public's important interests in the
efficient performance of governmental functions and in preserving employee discipline and harmony sufficient to achieve that end.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 (1983).
Id. at 152.
2'
Justice Marshall claimed in Rankin that "Mlust as erroneous statements
must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to
survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must
be similarly protected." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387 (quoting Bond v. Floyd, 385 US.
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sation with Dr. Koch and Nurse Perkins-Graham addressed
these issues, and informed Perkins-Graham about them. While
Perkins-Graham may have found Churchill's speech disagreeable, or even offensive, this should not have prevented the
Court from carefully considering the content of the speech and
extending it proper first amendment protection."
Unfortunately, a majority of the Waters Court viewed critical public-employee speech as a cause of workplace problems
rather than as a source of potential solutions. Although Justice
O'Connor claimed that she did not have to decide whether
Churchill's speech addressed a matter of public concern,9
she nevertheless characterized Churchill's speech as nothing
more than "complaining" and "criticism" that could
" Similar to Jus"discourag[e] people from coming to work. " 3°
tice White's approach in Connick, Justice O'Connor appears to
have focused as much on the potential motive behind
Churchill's speech as on the actual content of the conversation.
Clearly Churchill's motive for speaking is irrelevant to a determination of whether her speech addressed a matter of public
concern. The critical motive in cases like Waters is that of the
government employer which discharged the employee for his or
her speech.
More importantly, the Court failed to recognize the value
of insights and opinions that employees like Churchill possess
about their workplace. Indeed, employees' concerns often serve
as the basis for revamping institutional procedures that previously have hindered the efficient discharge of employer responsibilities. The plurality opinion did not acknowledge that MDH
employees could contribute to the development and execution
of the cross-training policy through critical discussion, nor did
the Court consider that the public's interests in quality health
care are implicated by such a policy. Certainly the public has a
broad interest in hearing, and more importantly participating

116, 136 (1966) (emphasis added)). In comparison to the speech protected in
Rankin, Churchill's speech addresses a wider range of policy issues about which
the public is concerned.
2" As the Rankin Court noted, "[tihe inappropriate or controversial character of
a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public
concern." Id.
"2 See infra notes 251-261 and accompanying text.
20 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890-91 (plurality opinion).
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in, the dialogue between health care providers and their employees as they attempt to resolve the range of problems found
in public hospitals.
Instead, the Waters plurality identified Churchill's speech
as pertaining solely to insignificant issues of interpersonal
relationships and hospital management. By so narrowly interpreting the parameters of the public-concern standard, the
Court attaches first amendment value to an employee's speech
only so far as it does not adversely impact the government
employers interest in efficiency. Such a myopic view of publicemployee speech also subordinates the public's interest in the
employee's speech to this same efficiency interest. This result
undermines the essential goal of the public-concern standard-permitting a public employee to speak out in the
workplace in order to advance a knowledgeable dialogue on
issues that the general public finds important. Waters exemplifies the Court's current position that employee speech in the
government workplace is rarely a means through which issues
of social and political importance are brought to the fore.
B. The Reasonable-Investigation Requirement as a Judicial
Impetus Towards Government Efficiency
Although the Waters plurality indicated that its sole task
was to determine the correct application of the Connick balancing test, it proceeded to alter fundamentally the constitutional
rights of public employees and the corresponding liabilities of
government employers. The contours of these rights and liabilities, however, are defined vaguely.
The Waters plurality created a new investigation requirement for employers on the ground that substantive first
amendment rights must be protected through "reliable procedures. " Yet it never anchored this requirement to the Con-

" Id. at 1884. Justice O'Connor claimed that '[t]his is why we have often held
some procedures ... to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected speech." Id. In the line of public.employee speech cases beginning
with Pickering, however, the Supreme Court never indicated a willingness to create a procedural safeguard for substantive free speech rights. The Court went no
further than imposing an evidentiary "burden of justifying the dicharge on legitimate grounds." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Connich v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983)). Indeed, creating this procedural safeguard was
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stitution. Justice O'Connor asserted that the First Amendment
does not compel the employer to conduct an investigation in
every situation where an employee's protected speech serves as
the basis for punishmentY2 Though there are an infinite
number of possible situations in which public-employee speech
may become the source of debate within the workplace, Justice
O'Connor made no attempt to determine when the First
Amendment requires such an investigation, or to define the
necessary scope and substance of the investigation. A government employer is left to wonder when an investigation is constitutionally mandated. The answer, according to Justice
O'Connor, depends on such malleable factors as the "cost of the
procedure and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the risks it would decrease and increase."'
The plurality's vague articulation of the new investigation
requirement is useless to a government employer, and stems
from circular reasoning. Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, a
government employer must ascertain whether the First
Amendment mandates the use of an investigatory procedure by
initially determining that the employee's speech implicates
substantive first amendment rights.' However, a government employer cannot determine that substantive free speech
unnecessary, as the Court shaped its doctrine by progressively limiting the substantive scope of public employees' free speech rights. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S.
at 138-39 (if a court is convinced that an employee's speech does not address a
matter of public concern, no balancing of interests is required); Mount Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (public employees
have the burden of demonstrating that the First Amendment protects their
speech); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (the scope of a

public employee's first amendment right to freedom of speech in the workplace is
limited in each situation by the government employer's need to "promot[e] the
efficiency of the public services it performs").
"' Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1885 (plurality opinion). This vague language yields
the confusing possibility that under certain circumstances, the Constitution does

not mandate the use of any procedure which will safeguard the employee's substantive free speech rights.

' Id. at 1886. Exactly what type of procedure the government employer should
utilize "involves a different mix of administrative burden, risk of erroneous punish.
ment of protected speech, and risk of erroneous exculpation of unprotected speech."
Id. at 1885. The plurality did not indicate how a court reviewing the actions of a
government employer should properly measure these ingredients.

1' Justice O'Connor defines the substantive free speech rights of public employees as the end result of a court's application of the Connick balancing test, i.e.,
speech which both addresses a matter of public concern and does not disrupt the
government's interest in efficiency. See id. at 1884.
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rights are at issue unless it first conducts an investigation into
the circumstances surrounding the speech. The practical result
of this confusion is that a government employer must perform
two distinct tasks to avoid potential constitutional liability for
employment decisions predicated on speech: (1) conduct an
investigation aimed at establishing the facts surrounding the
employee's speech; and (2) apply the Connick balancing test to
those facts to determine whether the First Amendment protects the employee's speech and precludes discharge.'
This result flows directly, and intentionally, from the
Court's desire to protect and promote government efficiency
interests. By implementing this amorphous first amendment
investigation requirement, the Waters Court seeks to encourage government employers to act "efficiently" before discharging an employee for speech, i.e., to conduct a comprehensive
investigation into the facts surrounding the employee's speech
to determine whether the speech is actually protected." A
' As Justice O'Connor claims, "ilf an employment action is bared on what an
employee supposedly said, and a reasonable supervisor would recognizo that there
is a substantial likelihood that what was actually said was protected, the manager
must tread with a certain amount of care." Id. at 1889 (emphasis added). This
ambiguous language virtually guarantees that a government employer will conduct
an investigation which thoroughly analyzes the potential protected nature of the
employee's speech. While Justice O'Connor's reasoning provides no workable standard for a government employer, however, it does afford a court substantial leeway in upholding whatever investigative procedures the employer uses.
It has been suggested that the Court should have relied on its prior decisions
in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) in order to "determine the appropriate degree of procedural protection in Waters." Leading Cases: The Suprcme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV.
261, 289 (1994). Under a Roth-Mathews analysis, the Waters Court would hold
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided Churchill
with a liberty interest "in avoiding erroneous discharge on the basis of protected
speech." Id. Thus, "[wihen the government has reason to believe that administrative action may incidentally infringe upon constitutional liberty, a trial court
should not defer to administrative factfinding unless the government has complied
with due process in reaching its factual determination. Id.
This analysis suffers from the same fundamental flaw as the plurality opinion. If a public employee has a substantive liberty interest in preventing arbitrary
discharge, the government employer must always conduct an investigation into the
content of the employee's speech to avoid violating the due process clause. Once
this procedure is complete, however, the employer can nevertheless disciplino the
employee based on its assertions that it reasonably believed that the First Amendment did not protect the employee's speech. Thus, the employee's freedom of
speech is no less susceptible to objectionable infringement by the employer under
this analysis than under the plurality's analysis.
21 The investigation requirement may also be used to supplement the Court's
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government employer is thereby fully prepared to defend its
employment decision in court as one based on a reasonable
investigation yielding reasonable results.
Waters thus ensures that the employer's investigative
efforts will not be in vain. The Court shields government employers from the risk that a jury will reach a different conclusion regarding the protected nature of an employee's speech
after conducting its own investigation.' 7 In addition, because
the government employer has acted "reasonably" by conducting
a thorough investigation,' a court applying the Connick test
to the employer's version of the speech will have little need to
interfere with employer decisionmaking. More importantly,
Waters frees lower courts from the obligation of making their
own inquiry into the protected nature of the speech, and from
defining the constitutional scope of public-employee free speech
beyond each particular case.
At the very least, Connick requires a court to analyze, as a
threshold issue, whether the employee's speech actually addressed a matter of public concern. Waters leaves this analysis
in the hands of the government employer. This outcome poses
an interesting dilemma, given Connick's sliding scale of constitutional protection for employee speech. 9 Waters allows a

causation analysis developed in Mount Healthy, which required a plaintiff to "show
that [her] conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a
'substantial factor ... or 'motivating factor' in the [employer's] decision not to
rehire [her]." Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
287 (1977). Under this standard, the employee's evidentiary burden is quite high,
and thus a government employer has little incentive to determine what the employee actually said before making its employment decision. By requiring a government employer to conduct an investigation, the Court forces both parties to get
their facts straight before the inception of a lawsuit. Of course, if the employer
has conducted a constitutionally acceptable investigation, it becomes irrelevant that
the protected speech was a substantial factor in the employee's discharge. After
all, it is not "a violation of the Constitution for a government employer to discharge an employee based on substantively incorrect information." Waters, 114 S.
Ct. at 1890 (plurality opinion).
"' The Seventh Circuit would disagree with this result: "The status of
Churchill's speech is a question of law, but ... where the content of the speech is
in dispute, the substance of the speech is a question of fact for the jury to resolve." Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1992).
"3 Waters establishes an extremely deferential reasonableness standard of review for government-employer decisions regarding both the type of investigation
conducted as well as the results drawn from such an investigation. See discussion
infra text accompanying notes 240-259.
"' Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).

19951

PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH

1103

government employer to tailor its justifications to the findings
of fact that it makes as a result of its own investigation. That
is, a government employer may conclude after an investigation
that almost all of the employee's speech addressed a matter of
public concern. Yet it can simply claim that it discharged the
employee for that part of the speech which did not address a
matter of public concern. Considering the extreme deference a

reviewing

court must give to government-employer

decisionmaking under Waters, it is highly unlikely that the

courts will find any employer's action unreasonable.
C. 'Unreasonable" Deference and the Potential-Disruption
StandardVoid FirstAmendment Protection
From the plurality's perspective, an excessively burdensome investigation requirement would hamper a government
employer's general goal of efficiency.24 Waters thus requires
lower courts to apply an extremely deferential reasonableness

standard of review when examining: (1) the propriety of the
investigative procedure used by the government employer in a

particular situation; (2) the conclusions a government employer
draws from such an investigation; and (3) the predictions of
harm a government employer uses to justify restricting em-

ployee speech."' Such an examination dramatically changes

Io The Court noted that this goal would be almost impossible to achieve if the
government employer's decisionmaking process was under the constant scrutiny of
a judicial factfinder. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888 (plurality opinion).
I Id. at 1887. The unquestioning quality of this deferential requirement also
encourages employees to remain silent where they otherwise may have engaged in
dialogue within the workplace. For example:
Waters appears to enhance institutional autonomy while reducing individual freedom of speech. While such deference [to employer
decisionmakingi touches on a narrow aspect of academic freedom, it could
have a chilling effect on faculty speech. Professors are not likely to speak
critically of their employer if they believe the employer could dinis
them for interfering with the efficient operation of the institution. Given
a national climate in which "political correctness threatens academi
freedom on campuses, how should professors proceed in the wake of Waters?
Terrence Leas & Charles J. Russo, Waters v. Churchilh Autonomy for the Academy
or Freedom for the Individual?, 93 EDUC. L. REP. 1099, 1131 (Dec. 1994).
Other commentators fear that "a disruptiveness test that equates all criticism of management with a public agency's interest in efficiently providing public
services undercuts the social movement toward managerial reform by making it far
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the relevant judicial inquiry from a careful balancing of substantive interests-the scope of the government agency's responsibilities, the impact of the employee's speech on the
government's ability to fulfill efficiently those responsibilities,
the public's interests in workplace reform and critical policy
debate generated by the speech-to a deferential evaluation of
the employer's decisions regarding the investigation.242 Moreover, the task of a court in determining what a "reasonable"
government employer would do in a particular situation involving employee free speech seems daunting at best, considering
the variety of government employers, the relative importance
of the particular "mission" or responsibility each employer
must discharge, the number of employees working at any given
time, and the different contexts in which employee speech may
rise to the level of public concern.
Justice O'Connor's application of the reasonableness stanriskier for employees to criticize management and participate directly in the policymaking process-forms of expression indispensable to developing efficient and costeffective public services." Bruce Bodner, Constitutional Rights-United States Supreme Court Gives Public Employers Greater Latitude to Curb Public Employee
Speech-Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), 68 TEMP. L. REV. 461 (1995).
' For example, a judicial determination of reasonableness in these cases involves "courts look[ing] to the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be."
Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In his concurrence, Justice Scalia hypothesized the potential outcomes for an employer faced
with a judicial decision that its investigation was unreasonable:
One could say that the discharge without observance of the constitutionally requisite procedures is invalid, and must be set aside unless and
until those procedures are complied with. Alternatively, one could charge
the employer who failed to conduct a reasonable investigation with
knowledge of the protected speech that a jury later finds-producing a
sort of constructive retaliatory discharge, and entitling the employee to
full reinstatement and damages. Or alternatively again, the jury could be
required to determine what information a reasonable investigation would
have turned up, and then to decide whether it would have been permissible for the employer to fire the employee based on that information.
Id. at 1897.
Justice Scalia asserts that these possibilities are a direct result of the Court's
vague and ambiguous investigation requirement. According to him, this problem
will only be resolved if the Court completely rejects the notion that the First
Amendment provides government employees with the procedural right to an investigation. Id. at 1895. Justice Scalia's criticism, however, is misplaced. The
plurality's investigation requirement is not necessarily the problem. What presents
the philosophical and practical difficulties is the plurality's dual requirement that
a court rely on the factual findings of the employer's investigation, and then defer
to the employer's decisions made pursuant to such an investigation, with only the
perfunctory reasonableness inquiry as a guide.
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dard to the facts of Waters also demonstrates that the Supreme
Court will now treat government-employer decisionmaking
with near reverence."4 For example, the plurality stated that
"Churchill's speech may have substantially dampened PerkinsGraham's interest in working in obstetrics." 2 " Moreover, because Perkins-Graham allegedly viewed Churchill's statements
about management as "unkind and inappropriate," Churchill's
"complaining... threatened to undermine management's authority in Perkins-Graham's eyes." 4 The plurality further
noted that Churchill's reported statement about the tension between Waters and herself "could certainly make management
doubt Churchill's future effectiveness."246 Such unsupported

"'

Justice O'Connors unwillingness to put any bite into the reasonableness

standard is clear solely from her description of its constitutional necessity. According to Justice O'Connor, the Court has "never held that it is a violation of the
Constitution for a government employer to discharge an employee based on substantively incorrect information." Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890. She then casually
states that at-will employees like Churchill "generally [have] no claim based on
the Constitution at all" Id, Apparently public employees should be thankful for
the meager level of first amendment protection afforded by the plurality's reasonableness inquiry.
Justice O'Connor further concluded that the petitioners' belief about the unprotected nature of Churchill's speech was entirely reasonable based upon the
investigation they had conducted. Justice O'Connor noted that "[bjy the end of the
termination process, [MI)H] . . . had the word of two trusted employees, the en-

dorsement of those employees! reliability by three hospital managem, and the benefit of a face-to-face meeting with the employee . . . fired Waters, 114 S. CL at
1890 (plurality opinion). The plurality did not explain, however, why it was reasonable for NDH to avoid interviewing Dr. Koch, Nurse Welty or Churchill herself
regarding the content of the conversation. Moreover, when the ]MDH administrative
board called Churchill to discuss the conversation, it informed her "that the discussion would be limited to (a) the written warning she received (b) the negative
comments on her December 1986 evaluation; and (c) the incident when she criticized Waters and Davis to an unidentified cross.trainee in obstetrics one evening."
Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1119 (7th Cir. 1992). Incredibly, the board
never discussed the incident and refused to discuss the substance of Churchill's
allegations regarding the cross-training policy. Id. There was also no evidence
indicating that Waters or Davis "followed the hospital's general guidelines for
discipline." Id at 1127 n.10. A majority of the Court evinces little concern that
such lapses in a government employer's investigation could lead to the discharge
of an employee based on incomplete information or mistaken belief. Waters thus
suggests that the reasonableness standard is really nothing more than what Justice Scalia referred to as a basic ijludicial inquiry into the genuineness of a public employer's asserted permissible justification for an employment decision ...
Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1895 (plurality opinion).
2" Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1890-91 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1891 (emphasis added).
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generalizations by the Court masked the true issues that
Churchill's speech raised-the nature and scope of MDH's obligations as a public hospital to develop safe and effective crosstraining policies for its nursing staff, the demands on staff
members responsible for implementing such polices, and the
resulting effects on public health care. Under Pickering, the
Court was correct to examine the deleterious impact that
Churchill's speech may have had on discipline and harmony
within the MDH workplace-but Pickering would have required the hospital to prove that such a negative impact actually occurred. After Waters, however, it appears that lower
courts reviewing public-employee speech cases are free to speculate about the negative impact that the employee's speech
may have had in the government workplace.24" In the process, they can ignore the larger issues of workplace reform and
public debate and simply assume away the first amendment
rights of the employee." 8

' The Waters Court proffered further examples of employee speech that could
hinder a government employer's effective discharge of its responsibilities: (1) "offensive utterance[s] to members of the public;" (2) being "rude to customers;" (3) a
governor's deputy "robustly criticiz[ing]" the governor's legislative program; and (4)
an employee who counsels a coworker to ignore the rules of the workplace. Waters,
114 S. Ct. at 1886 (plurality opinion). Not one of Justice O'Connor's examples,
however, remotely involves speech which addresses a matter of public concern-the
only substantive free speech right public employees have under the Court's current
analysis. A government employer faced with these types of speech would have
little difficulty in satisfying Connick's "content, form and context" test to justify
discharging the employee for uttering unprotected speech.
uB Prior to Waters, actual disruption was generally perceived as the constitutional benchmark for determining when the employee's speech had adversely impacted the employer's efficiency interests. See Piesco v. City of New York Dep't of
Personnel, 933 F.2d 1149, 1160 (2d Cir. 1991); Roth v. Veteran's Admin., 856 F.2d
1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988); White v. Washington, 898 P.2d 331, 338 (Ct. App.
Wash. 1995). Subsequent cases now rely on the potential disruption standard. See
Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 1995) (police department did not
violate the First Amendment by suspending an officer who wore an offensive Halloween costume because "[g]overnment predictions of disruption used to justify
restrictions of employee speech are given 'greater deference' than predictions used
to justify restrictions on speech by the public.") (citing Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887);
Zaretsky v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 140, 145, 638
N.E.2d 986, 989, 615 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (1994) (noting that the government employer "is under no constitutional or legal obligation to retain an employee whose
conduct [it] deems disruptive of its operation"); Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Michigan Employment Relations Comm'n, Nos. 184125, 184126, 184227, 1995 WL
472130, at 9 (Ct. App. Mich. Aug. 1, 1995) (state law expanding the prohibition
against strikes and disruption by public school employees does not violate First
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While not part of its stated objective in deciding the case,

Amendment since Waters, inter alia, does not require "that the disturbance be the
intended consequence of the speech").
The dangers of the potential disruption standard to public-employea speech
are dramatically illustrated by the well-known case of Jeffries v. Harleston, 52
F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995). In Jeffries, City University of New York (CUNY') professor
Leonard Jeffries gave a speech in which he discussed racism in New York public
schools and made anti-Semitic remarks. CUNY denied the professor another threeyear term as Chairman of the Black Studies Department. The Second Circuit initially found that CUNY had violated Jeffries' first amendment rights, stating that
"[CUNY has] provided meager evidence at best that Jeffries' speech had any real
disruptive effect on CUNY operations . . . " Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238,
1247 (2d Cir. 1994). One month later, the Supreme Court remanded the case for
analysis in light of Waters. The Second Circuit reversed its prior decision:
We are now constrained to hold under Waters that the defendants did
not violate Jefflies' free speech ifi (1) it was reasonable for them to believe that the Albany speech would disrupt CUNY operations; (2) the
potential interference with CUNY operations outweighed the first amendment value of the Albany speech; and (3) they demoted Jeffiies because
they feared the ramifications for CUNY, or, at least, for reasons wholly
unrelated to the Albany speech.
Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 13. This reasoning is contrary to the courts earlier view that
"a mere reasonable belief that the speech would interfere with the employer's
operations is not enough to discipline an employee," and thus "the defendants bore
the burden at trial to show that the speech actually interfered with CUNY operations." Id. at 12. Waters sent a clear message to lower court judges: public-employee speech fiustrates employer decisionmaMng and prevents efficient government,
and thus the First Amendment offers it only minimal protection.
Nevertheless, some courts have distinguished Waters in order to limit its
applicability to particular cases. See, eg., Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
42 F.3d 1217, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that under the Piexring-Water
line of cases, "public-employee speech deserves far greater protection when the
employee is speaking not simply upon employment matters of personal or internal
interest but instead 'as a citizen upon matters of public concern") (citing Connick,
461 U.S. at 307), rehg en banc granted, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995); Feldman v.
Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 831 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Because there is no
difference between the facts as found and the facts as the defendants may have
viewed them at the time, this case does not present the issues recently addressed . . . in Waters."). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself distinguished Waters in
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995),
where it conducted a rigorous analysis of the Ethics in Government Act. The Act
prohibited certain government employees from receiving honoraria. In finding that
the prohibition imposed a significant and unconstitutional burden on employee free
speech, the Court concluded that "the Government is unable to justify [the ban] on
the grounds of immediate workplace disruption asserted in Pickering and the cases
that followed it." Id- at 1015. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor claimed
that the Waters "principle [of deference to employer declsionmalring] has its limits.... As the magnitude of intrusion on employees' interests rises, so does the
Government's burden of justification" Id. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is
likely, however, that lower courts will use Waters's potentil-disruption standard
with more frequency in public-employee speech cases.
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the Waters Court therefore revised the Connick balancing test.
Justice O'Connor maintained that under Connick, the First
Amendment did not protect Churchill's speech.249 Inexplicably, she reached this conclusion without first resolving
whether Churchill's speech even addressed a matter of public
concern-the threshold issue in the Connick balancing test. Instead, she simply declared that the Court did not have to determine whether Churchill's speech addressed a matter of
public concern because "[a]s a matter of law, this potential
disruptiveness [of her speech] was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the speech might have had." 0
Under this analysis, a government employer confronted with
reports of what its employee said can immediately decide to
discharge the employee if it believes, based on its knowledge of
the employment relationship and the workplace environment,
that the speech may disrupt the employer's efficiency interests.
Thus, a government employer can base its decision to discharge an employee merely on the speech as reported, and not
on the speech as determined through an investigation. 1 In
this situation, a court is not required to determine whether the
employee's speech actually addressed a matter of public concern, because whatever first amendment value the employee's
speech had is automatically balanced and outweighed by the
employer's interest in efficient decisionmaking." Essentially,
'

Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890 (plurality opinion).
at 1891.
"8 Justice O'Connor asserted that "[i]t may be unreasonable, for example, for

20 Id.

the employer to come to a conclusion based on no evidence at all." Id. at 1889
(emphasis added). Therefore, it may not be unreasonable in certain circumstances

for an employer to discharge an employee without first conducting an investigation. Justice O'Connor admits that "there will often be situations in which reasonable employers would disagree about ... how much investigation needs to be
done ....
In those situations, many different courses of action will necessarily be
reasonable." Id. at 1889. The reasonableness inquiry of Waters thus offers no more

judicial scrutiny than the pretext inquiry which the Court used in Mount Healthy,
and assures that few, if any, government-employer investigative procedures will be
found "unreasonable
2 It is also possible that the Court contemplated that lower courts will balance
the potential disruptiveness of the employee's speech against the necessity of con-

ducting the Connick balancing analysis. Thus, if the court resolved that the potential disruptiveness of the employee's speech was great enough, it would not per-

form a Connick balancing test to determine whether the speech indeed addressed
a matter of public concern. If the court resolved that the potential disruptiveness
of the employee's speech was not that great, it would then apply Connick. Justice
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then, the Waters Court implemented a reverse Connick balancing analysis which provides government employers with the
means to circumvent the investigation requirement without
incurring constitutional liability.
The Court's use of Connick's potential disruption standard
will undoubtedly punish employee speech that the First
Amendment has previously protected.' This standard is dramatically different from the one enunciated in Pickering,which
required some evidentiary finding that the speech actually affected the government employer's interests.' By categorizing
Churchill's speech as potentially disruptive, and therefore
beyond first amendment protection, Waters entirely refocuses
the nature of the balancing inquiry and significantly restricts
the ability of the judiciary to extend first amendment protection to employee speech. Judges no longer must determine
whether, as a matter of law, the employee's speech addressed a
matter of public concern.' Nor are judges bound to conduct

O'Connor did not specify a standard against which a court could measure potential
disruptiveness.
The Court's deference to the petitioners' predictions of disruption from
Churchill's speech is strikingly similar to the deference it typically extends in
cases involving economic regulation. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding a Congressional statute establishing aggregate limits of liability for a single nuclear accident within the atomic
energy industry); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (sustaining a Kansas
law preventing non-attorneys from engaging in debt adjustment); WYilliamson v.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma statute prohibiting opticians from placing lenses into eyeglass frames without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist). In these cases, the Court hypothesized valid legislative objectives in order to sustain the particular governmant
regulation or restriction. For example, the Widliamson Court held that the state
legislature "might have concluded" that prescriptions were sometimes necessary to
ensure accurate fittings and to encourage the use of eye examinations. Widliamson,
348 U.S. at 487. Waters demonstrates that the Court has reached that extreme in
the public-employee speech context.
I"In Pickering, the school board had alleged that the respondent's letter to the
newspaper would damage professional reputations and "foment controversy and
conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators, and the residents. Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968). The Pickering Court noted that "no evidence to support these allegations was introduced at the hearing," and that the
board could not have reasonably concluded that the statements were par re detrimental to its efficiency interests. Id. at 570-71.
1 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) ('The inquiry into the
protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.") and id. at 150 n.10 ("'11M Constitution.... compel[s us] to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and
the circumstances under which they [are] made ... [We cannot avoid making an
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a Pickering-type analysis, where the Court confronted the
particular problem of reviewing the facts surrounding an
employee's speech when the employer alone had control of
those facts. 6 In Pickering, the Court noted that "where constitutional rights are in issue an independent examination of
the record will be made [by us] in order that the controlling
legal principles may be applied to the actual facts of the
case.' 7 But the Waters Court essentially states that the government employer need not "tread with a certain amount of
care,'
but can act with virtual impunity when it believes,
or more likely merely asserts, that the employee's speech potentially disrupts the workplace. 9 After Waters, therefore,

independent constitutional judgement on the facts of the case.") (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court has clearly described the responsibility of the judiciary
when it confronts first amendment cases: "[Tin cases raising First Amendment
issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to 'make
an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)); accord
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). It is during this first part of the
Connick analysis that public employees' freedom of speech interests are most vul.
nerable. Independent appellate review of the content of the employee's speech
provides another opportunity to determine what the employee actually said, as
well as the proper constitutional protection to be afforded the speech.
" The Pickering Court asserted that the school board, which served as the
trier of fact in its review of Pickering's letter, "was the same body that was also
both the victim of appellant's statements and the prosecutor that brought the
charges aimed at securing his dismissal." Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township
High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 580 n.2 (1968).
Id. The Pickering Court proceeded to examine de novo all of the evidence
surrounding Pickering's letter and the school board's justifications for dismissing
Pickering based on its contents. It is interesting that the Court performed such a
comprehensive review when Pickering's letter contained all the facts necessary for
a resolution of the case. Unlike Pickering, the Waters Court simply accepted
MDIH's version of the facts surrounding Churchill's speech, despite the dramatically
conflicting reports which it had obtained. See supra notes 245-250 and accompanying text.
28 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889 (plurality opinion).
"' Moreover, Justice
O'Connor ignored one factor that was critical to the
Court's decision in Rankin-the "responsibilities of the employee within the agency." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987). The Rankin Court stated that
"[w]here . .. an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact
role, the danger to the agency's successful functioning from that employee's private
speech is minimal."
Id. at 390-91. It is clear that while Churchill's position did
bring her into contact with the public, it did not involve any significant confiden-
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lower courts must balance the employee's speech interest in a

vacuum.
D. Government Efficiency and the Sovereign/Employer
Distinction
Because the government acting as employer must achieve
a multitude of goals in a variety of capacities, the Waters plurality argued that it should not burden government-employer
decisionmakdng with judicial definitions of efficiency. Justice
O'Connor thus broadly redefined government efficiency interests. She claimed that one of a government employer's goals is
simply "efficient employment decisionmaking," which includes
the employer's ability to restrict employee speech that may
interfere with this decisionmaidng. If an employee's speech
somehow affects the government employer's ability to implement policy decisions as it sees fit, the speech hinders employer efficiency and deserves only minimal first amendment protection. In this way, not only the efficient fulfillment of institutional responsibilities, but also the control of employee behavior, including speech, becomes a legitimate end for the govern261
ment employer.
The flaw in the Waters plurality's approach is that it depends on a false distinction between the government's interests
in efficiency when it acts as employer and as sovereign. Justice
O'Connor argues that "[tihe government's interest in achieving
its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated
from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign
to a significant one when it acts as employer.'
The converse of Justice O'Connor's argument, of course, is that an
individual's interests in free speech must necessarily depreciate from a significant interest to a subordinate one depending

tial or policymaking aspects. Mfore importantly, the only reason that Perldn-Gmham brought Churchill's comments to the attention of MIDH officials was to inform
Waters. There is no evidence which indicates that Churchil's speech had any
other effect on the efficient functioning of AEDH.
2o

Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888 (plurality opinion).

Unfortunately for public employees, the Court did not similarly characterize

the exercise of free speech itself as a legitimate end for government workers.
I Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor acknowledged
that "we have always assumed [this] premise is correct

=

Id. at 1886.
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upon whether the individual is speaking as citizen or as employee. Such a zero-sum analysis prevents the Court from
conducting a principled balancing of the competing interests
involved in each case because it virtually excludes the First
Amendment from judicial consideration.
Judges will be unable to conduct a truly objective balancing unless the Court abandons the untenable distinction between the interests of the government as sovereign and as
employer. The interests of the government in efficiency are
inherently the same regardless of the capacity in which the
government acts. The overall goal of the government is to operate as efficiently as possible under all circumstances. What
changes is not the government's interest in efficiency, but the
impact of the individual's speech on the government's ability to
discharge its responsibilities as efficiently as possible. Whether
the speaker is a member of the public or a member of the
workforce, the government employer must still strive toward
efficiently fulfilling its goals. The government's interest in efficiency does not differ when a public university is unable to
schedule classes because of students protesting university
admission criteria or employees protesting university hiring
criteria. Nor does it differ when citizens on a local community
board criticize the care available at a municipal hospital or
when employees in a local union criticize the care provided at
that same hospital. In these situations, the government seeks
to discharge its responsibilities as efficiently as possible regardless of whether the source of the speech is an employee or
a citizen.
What does change, however, is the potential impact of the
speech on government efficiency interests, depending on who is
speaking. Individuals who exercise their free speech rights
while serving as public employees often can affect the efficiency of the government employer more quickly and substantially
than like-minded individuals speaking as members of the general public outside the government agency. The solution to this
problem is not, as Waters suggests, to require a different level
of judicial scrutiny when the government acts as employer
instead of sovereign.
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IV. A SUGGESTED
BALANCING

APPROACH:

RETURNING

TO

GENUINE

A two-step alternative to the Waters Court's approach
would level the judicial playing field for public employees without undermining a government employer's legitimate interests
in efficiency. First, the jury must be restored to its neutral
factfinding role in determining the content of the speech for
which the government employer allegedly sanctioned the employee. Second, in order to provide adequate first amendment
protection to speech that addresses matters of concern to both
the employee and the public, courts must abandon the false
distinction between the government's efficiency interests when
it acts as employer rather than sovereign, and rigorously scrutinize government-employer decisions predicated on employee

speech.
Using a jury avoids having the government employer establish the universe of operative facts upon which a court will
conduct the balancing analysis. A government employer faced
with investigating the speech of an employee with whom it has
a tenuous relationship would undoubtedly find it difficult to
remain impartial throughout the investigation. This lack of
objectivity may also manifest itself earlier in the process, when
the government employer makes the initial decision concerning
the type of investigatory procedure to utilize. Thus, if an employee like Cheryl Churchill has been particularly outspoken
on certain sensitive workplace issues, the government employer would be encouraged to conduct only a cursory investigation
into the reported speech before discharging the employee. Such
a scenario is especially likely if the government employer also
claims that the reported speech was "potentially disruptive,"
thereby negating the need for a more extensive investigation.
A jury is the only adequate check on government employers'
broad discretion to discharge employees on the basis of speech.
Moreover, jury factfinding in public-employee speech cases
will not hinder government-employer efficiency to any greater
degree than the Waters plurality's investigation requirement.
First, government employers are constantly monitoring employee activities in the workplace and utilize sophisticated
recordkeeping techniques to track the information generated.
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Reference to those records at trial will suffice in most cases to
show that the government employer did not discharge the
employee for constitutionally protected speech. Thus, a government employer attempting to sanction an employee for speech
would not be forced to utilize more investigative resources in
order to convince a jury that its employment decision withstands constitutional scrutiny. Second, and more importantly,
the government employer need not undertake a more thorough
inquiry than the reasonable investigation required by Waters.
Where the government employer is not, in fact, taking punitive
measures because of protected employee speech, the fruits of a
truly reasonable investigation should convince a jury that the
employer's action did not run afoul of the First Amendment.
The jury's factfinding responsibilities under this proposed
model would be twofold: first, to determine the content of the
employee's statements; and second, to determine whether the
government employer sanctioned the employee because of
those statements. In determining the content of the employee's
speech, the jury need not consider the form and context of the
speech, because these factors have relevance only in ascertaining whether the employee's speech hindered the government
employer's ability to discharge its responsibilities in an efficient manner.263 In determining whether the employer sanctioned the employee because of his or her speech, the jury
must consider the employer's assertions that it acted without
regard to the employee's speech at issue, i.e., that it sanctioned
the employee for reasons independent of the employee's speech.
If the employer can convince the jury that these reasons were
valid and not merely pretextual, then the employer has sufficiently carried its evidentiary burden and the claim should be
dismissed.
Thus, even with a neutral factfinder, the Mount Healthy
analysis remains viable protection for the government employer.2" Unlike Mount Healthy, however, the employee is not
initially required to demonstrate that his or her speech is both
' As Justice Brennan stated: "It is beyond dispute that how and where a
public employee expresses his views are relevant in the second half of the [balancing] inquiry-determining whether the employee's speech adversely affects the
government's interests as an employer." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 159
(1983).
" See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally protected and a "substantial factor" in the
employer's decision. The employee may have spoken only once
or as part of an ongoing dialogue within the government
workplace. The onus here is on the government employer to
prove that it would have sanctioned its employee despite the
speech. The government employer does not meet this burden if
it defends its actions on a "last straw" theory. That is, the
government employer may not claim that the employee's
speech was the final incident in a string of prior violations of
workplace rules or lapses in performance on the part of the
employee which, if taken alone, would have justified sanctioning the employee. So long as the employer sanctioned the employee in response to the employee's speech, a potential constitutional violation has occurred. With a jury reviewing its actions, government employers will be discouraged from immediately sanctioning an employee who speaks out in the
workplace and, more importantly, from setting forth spurious
reasons for the sanction. Yet a government employer still has
ample opportunity to prove that it could constitutionally sanction the particular employee regardless of the employee's
speech.
After the jury determines the content of the employee's
speech and concludes that the government employer indeed
sanctioned the employee because of his or her speech, the
judge performs step two of the analysis. Here, the judge must
not provide greater deference to the sanctioning decision of the
government merely because it acted in its capacity as employer
rather than sovereign. Instead, the judge weighs the interests
of the employee and the public in the speech directly against
the efficiency interests of the government employer, without
resorting to various levels of judicial scrutiny that depend upon
the capacity in which the government acted.
Under this balancing process, the interests of the employee
may be construed more broadly than the current public-concern standard allows to include the full range of interests
which an individual citizen may have in exercising the freedom
of speech right. Moreover, this process recognizes that the
public's interest in efficient government is implicated not only
by allowing employees to speak, but also by silencing them.
When the government silences an employee who speaks on
matters related to the functioning of the government agency
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for which he or she works, the public is denied the ability to
make informed decisions about how best to reform and improve government. Safeguarding society's power to govern
itself through the exchange of information from an individual
to the community is at the core of the first amendment's protection for speech and should not be weakened by judicial deference to the government acting in a capacity other than sovereign.
In balancing the interests of the government, a judge must
consider whether the employer has: (1) identified the nature
and scope of its responsibilities; (2) established that it conducted a fifll investigation into the substance of the employee's
speech; and (3) demonstrated that the employee's speech prevented the employer from discharging those responsibilities in
an efficient manner. The efficiency interests of the government
employer need not be construed any more broadly than the
"effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise" formulation enunciated by the Rankin Court.265 Thus a court
must carefully assess the actual impact of the employee's
speech on this goal utilizing Givhan's "manner, time and place"
standard as the basis for the assessment. 6 Whether such
factors as "[d]iscouraging people from coming to work for a
department," "threaten[ing] to undermine management's authority" and "mak[ing] management doubt [one's] effectiveness"
as an employee in fact implicate the government employer's
ability to function effectively, as the Waters Court contends,
can only be determined after a thorough and rigorous review of
the evidence in each case. 7 Justice O'Connor's suggestion
that a court consider "efficient decisionmaking" to be a universal and independent goal of government employers is simply
incompatible with a fair balancing analysis.
Under this proposed model, the government would not be
constitutionally liable for sanctioning employees who have
engaged in speech that actually affected the ability of the government employer to fulfill its assigned responsibilities efficiently. Government restrictions of employee speech based
merely upon speculation and conjecture, however, would not be
" Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
26 See discussion supra notes 58-65.
"7

Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890-91 (plurality opinion).
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tolerated, as such actions involve exactly the type of repression
which the first amendment was designed to prevent. If the
employee's speech did not have a deleterious effect, the First
Amendment protects the speech regardless of whether it addressed matters of public concern or private interest. This
analysis eliminates the question of whether the government
employer sanctioned its employee based on a "reasonable mistake" about the content or protected nature of the employee's
speech, or whether the employer simply conducted an inadequate investigation into such speech.
This proposal restores the jury to its traditional role as
neutral factfinder and abandons the Connick threshold analysis, which requires employees to prove that their speech is
constitutionally "protected" before a reviewing court can conduct the balancing analysis. It also rejects the series of "prebalancing" analyses in Waters that force a judge to concentrate
almost exclusively on two factors unrelated to the critical first
amendment interests at issue: the constitutional parameters of
the government employer's investigation as a first amendment
procedural requirement; and the level of potential disruption
that the government employer contends would have occurred
in the workplace as a result of the speech. Instead, the proposal allows both judge and jury to focus their attention squarely
on the content of the employee's speech, the speech's impact
within the work environment and the employer's justifications
for sanctioning the employee because of the speech.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, Waters may appear to provide a measure of
judicial protection for public-employee speech rights. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires a government
employer to conduct a reasonable investigation into an
employee's workplace speech before making any employment
decision predicated on that speech. Upon closer examination,
however, it is clear that Waters offers government employers
an unprecedented opportunity to control and restrict employee
speech. Public employees punished for speaking out at work
may no longer submit their case to the rigorous scrutiny of a
neutral factfinder, and can expect judicial review to be a rubber stamp of constitutionality for government decisions. More
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importantly, the Court's reluctance to articulate any constitutional parameters for the investigation requirement, its confusing reformulation of the already muddled Connick balancing
analysis, and its expansive redefinition of government efficiency interests exemplify its willingness to abandon public-employee first amendment rights at the door of the government
workplace.
Waters rests on two flawed premises: first, that the
government's interest in efficiency varies depending on whether it acts as sovereign or as employer; and second, that an
employee's exercise of first amendment rights naturally leads
to disruption in the workplace, interference with the
government's ability to discharge its obligations efficiently, and
litigation in the courts. Relying on these premises instead of
principled reasoning, the Waters Court ignores the central
values underlying the First Amendment and prevents an objective balancing of interests. The result is an unprincipled limitation of public-employee speech. Waters thus leaves publicemployee free speech doctrine in such disarray that it fails to
provide any consistent guidance to employers, employees or
lower courts.
There is no dispute that government employers require
flexibility in making those employment decisions that are necessary to fulfill agency responsibilities in an efficient and effective manner. Both the public as well as the government share
a common and substantial interest in furthering this goal. Yet
these decisions cannot be made in a constitutional vacuum,
with public-employee speech rights sacrificed in the name of
efficient government. A public employee's comments about his
or her employer's policies and practices serve as the basis for
workplace reform, increase public awareness of these issues
and stimulate debate on a community level. Before silencing
public employees, the Court must demand that a government
employer clearly identify its particular responsibilities and how
the employee speech at issue prevented it from efficiently discharging those responsibilities.
Accordingly, the Court must recognize that public-employee speech advances basic values that the First Amendment
protects. The Court cannot continue to balance away the substantive first amendment rights of public employees in order to
promote and enhance government efficiency interests with
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blind uniformity. It is essential for the Court to accept the
inherent conflict in public employment between employees'
exercise of individual liberties and employers' efficient discharge of institutional responsibilities. Ultimately, this conflict
can only be resolved when the Court regains the will to balance the competing interests critically yet fairly, and restores
free speech rights to their preferred position in our constitutional jurisprudence.
Edward J. Velazquez

